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ABSTRACT 
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF LOWERING DISCLOSURE THRESHOLDS: 
PROPOSED CHANGES TO SFAS NO. 5 
FEBRUARY 2011 
KIRSTEN FANNING, B.S.B.A., DREXEL UNIVERSITY 
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
Directed by:  Professor Christopher P. Agoglia 
Recently, investors have asserted that firms‟ loss contingency disclosures are not 
adequate to allow them to assess the likelihood of material losses due to litigation (i.e., 
litigation risk), and a debate has developed over whether the threshold for disclosure 
should be lowered to provide investors with more information relating to litigation.  
Using an experiment, I investigate two unintended consequences of lowering a disclosure 
threshold, as the FASB has recently proposed.  First, I find that adding low probability 
lawsuits to the disclosure of reasonably possible lawsuits lowers prospective investors‟ 
perceptions of litigation risk relating to the disclosure, even though more lawsuits are 
disclosed.  Second, lowering the threshold allows firms to portray the entire disclosure 
opportunistically, diverting attention from higher probability to lower probability 
lawsuits.  I find evidence that firms can use such an opportunistic presentation under a 
lower threshold to their advantage.  Specifically, prospective investors‟ and even short 
investors‟ perceptions were just as favorable to the firm as long investors‟ when the 
disclosure threshold was lower and firms adopted an opportunistic disclosure strategy.  
Thus, my findings suggest that the FASB‟s proposal to require disclosure of lower 
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probability loss contingencies may have unintended consequences for investors‟ 
perceptions of firms‟ loss exposure. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1     Introduction 
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 5: Accounting for 
Contingencies (SFAS 5) is the current guidance for disclosure of loss contingencies.  
Under SFAS 5, loss contingencies, such as pending litigation, are required to be disclosed 
when the probability is “at least reasonably possible” that a material loss may be incurred 
(FASB 1975).  Recently, the quality of firms‟ loss contingency disclosures has been 
criticized by investors, and a debate has developed about whether or not SFAS 5 should 
be amended (Desir et al. 2010).  Investors have asserted that disclosures under SFAS 5 do 
not adequately allow them to predict and assess the likelihood, amount, and timing of 
future cash flows (FASB 2008; Desir et al. 2010).  Investors further allege that too often 
firms are not disclosing loss contingencies until a material loss has been incurred, leaving 
them unable to appropriately incorporate contingencies into their judgments, which could 
lead to a suboptimal allocation of investors‟ resources (Cheney 2008; Desir et al. 2010).  
Because of the inherent vagueness in the verbal probability threshold under SFAS 5 of 
“at least reasonably possible”, firms may be able to easily justify this lack of disclosure 
even for lawsuits with higher probabilities of loss (e.g., Reimers 1992; Amer et al. 1995; 
Piercey 2009). 
 In response to these concerns, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) 
issued Exposure Draft: Disclosure of Certain Loss Contingencies: An Amendment of 
FASB Statements No. 5 and 141(R) in June 2008.  The FASB proposed lowering the 
probability threshold for disclosure of loss contingencies from “at least reasonably 
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possible” to “more than remote” (FASB 2008, paragraph 5).  This study investigates two 
unintended consequences of lowering a disclosure threshold. 
1.2 Disclosure of Lower Probability Lawsuits  
 The Exposure Draft states that this lower threshold would “expand the population 
of loss contingencies that are required to be disclosed” (FASB 2008, p. vi).  Thus, if the 
probability threshold for disclosure is lowered to “more than remote”, the number of loss 
contingencies that would be required to be disclosed should increase for many firms.  
More recently, the FASB has also considered lowering the disclosure threshold even 
further to include some remote losses (FASB 2009).  Thus, any additional disclosures 
that result from lowering the disclosure threshold would, by definition, relate to lawsuits 
with low probability of losses.   
1.2.1 Prospective Investors 
Psychology theory suggests that adding low probability lawsuits could potentially 
decrease investors‟ perceptions of litigation risk for the disclosure by decreasing the 
influence of the higher probability lawsuits (Nisbett et al. 1981; Tetlock and Boettger 
1989; Hackenbrack 1992; Glover 1997; Hoffman and Patton 1997; Shelton 1999).  That 
is, adding remote lawsuits to a disclosure may dilute, rather than add to, the impact of 
reasonably possible lawsuits if investors rely on the representativeness heuristic when 
judging the overall risk of loss due to disclosed litigation.   
The representativeness heuristic is a natural cognitive strategy that people use to 
assess the likelihood of an event by comparing the similarity of the information about the 
event with other known events (Kahneman and Tversky 1972).  The more similar the 
information about the possible event is to other known events, the more likely the event is 
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predicted to be (Nisbett et al. 1981; Zukier 1982; Tversky and Kahneman 1983; Frederick 
and Libby 1986; Tetlock and Boettger 1989; Hackenbrack 1992).   
For example, a higher probability lawsuit (i.e., a reasonably possible lawsuit) may 
call to mind other lawsuits that have led to material losses.  However, additional low 
probability lawsuits may result in recollections of frivolous lawsuits.  If investors rely on 
the representativeness heuristic to assess litigation risk, they may not perceive the 
additional, remote losses as adding to the reasonably possible loss, but rather lowering 
the similarity between the overall disclosure and lawsuits that generally lead to material 
losses.  As a result, prospective investors may judge the firm‟s exposure to loss from the 
disclosed litigation lower, even though more lawsuits are disclosed. 
1.2.2 Long and Short Investors 
When investors take a long or a short position in a firm, theory and prior research 
suggest they hold the preferred conclusion that they will realize a positive return on their 
investment, and thus, that their investment decision was appropriate (Hales 2007; Han 
and Tan 2010; Thayer 2011).  Consistent with their preferences for higher profitability 
and share price, long investors are motivated to interpret litigation disclosures as more 
favorable to the firm, while short investors (who require lower share prices in order to 
profit) are motivated to interpret litigation disclosures as less favorable. 
Motivated reasoning theory suggests that when decision makers are motivated to 
arrive at a particular preferred conclusion, they use cognitive strategies that allow them to 
reach their directional goals, within reasonableness constraints (Kunda 1990).  That is, 
people do not deliberately bias their judgments, but only reach a preferred conclusion to 
the extent that they can maintain an illusion of objectivity (Pyszczynski and Greenberg 
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1987; Kunda 1990).  Under the lower disclosure threshold, long and short investors will 
be motivated to perceive the likelihood of future losses consistent with their directional 
preferences, subject to reasonableness constraints.  As Kunda (1990) notes, individuals 
tend to selectively use, interpret, and weight additional information in ways that support 
their directional preferences (see also Wilks 2002).  Thus, under the lower disclosure 
threshold, long and short investors are likely to selectively search for and assimilate 
newly disclosed information about additional, relatively trivial lawsuits in a manner 
consistent with their motivated reasoning goals.   
1.3 Opportunistic Presentation of Lawsuits under a Lower Threshold 
 
Since firms have significant discretion in how they present these disclosures, it is 
likely that some managers will use the lower threshold to direct attention from higher 
probability lawsuits and portray the overall portfolio of contingent losses as favorably as 
possible.  Such a presentation strategy would be consistent with the opinion that 
managers have already expressed regarding lower probability lawsuits (e.g., that they are 
often frivolous or filed only for publicity purposes (The Wall Street Journal 2008)).  In 
addition, prior archival research provides evidence that managers try to present 
information in a light most favorable to the firm when disclosing information in order to 
persuade investors (Baginski et al. 2000; Schrand and Walther 2000).  Thus, it is likely 
that some managers will attempt to present disclosures under the lower threshold in as 
favorable a light as possible.   
Prior research has not examined how investors‟ directional preferences influence 
their judgments when management uses the discretion afforded them in accounting 
standards to strategically engage in opportunistic persuasion attempts.  It is unclear a 
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priori whether or not such a persuasion attempt would work as managers intend.  I draw 
upon the persuasion knowledge model (PKM) and emphasis framing theory to form 
competing hypotheses for this effect. 
PKM predicts that the influence of management‟s opportunistic presentation on 
investors‟ judgments may depend on investors‟ perspective.  For example, long investors, 
preferring higher corporate profits / share prices, are more likely to be persuaded by 
management‟s opportunistic presentation. However, short investors, preferring lower 
corporate profits / share prices (so that they can personally benefit from their investment), 
are more likely to be skeptical of management‟s opportunistic presentation (Friestad and 
Wright 1994).   
In contrast, emphasis framing theory predicts that this type of opportunistic 
presentation can work as intended.  According to this theory, communicators can 
influence others‟ opinions by emphasizing particular considerations over other relevant 
considerations when giving their interpretation of an issue (Nelson et al. 1997; Nelson 
and Oxley 1999; Druckman 2001; McCaffery and Baron 2004; Maule and Villejoubert 
2007; Slothuus 2008).  For example, Shankar and Tan (2006) find audit preparers employ 
emphasis framing to persuade reviewers by using language that emphasizes evidence that 
supports their preferred conclusion and downplays evidence that contradicts their 
conclusion.  In addition, prior research demonstrates that strategic persuasion attempts 
can be successful (Ricchuite 1999; Tan and Yip-Ow 2001; Kadous et al. 2005).  This 
suggests that, by strategically framing litigation disclosures, management may 
successfully persuade investors to perceive the litigation in a more favorable light. 
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1.4 Overview of the Study 
In my experiment, nonprofessional investors were given financial statements and 
legal disclosures for a hypothetical pharmaceutical company and were asked to assess the 
likelihood of material loss due to disclosed pending litigation (i.e., litigation risk).  
Participants were randomly assigned to a long, prospective, or short investment position, 
and to one of three disclosure conditions.  Participants received disclosures: (1) with a 
probability threshold of “at least reasonably possible” (i.e., consistent with existing SFAS 
5); (2) with a probability threshold of “more than remote” (i.e., consistent with the 
FASB‟s proposed amendment); or (3) with a probability threshold of “more than remote” 
(i.e., consistent with the FASB‟s proposed amendment) and an opportunistic reporting 
strategy allowed by the lower threshold.  The same reasonably possible lawsuit was 
presented in all three disclosure conditions because both SFAS 5 and the proposed 
amendment would require disclosure of lawsuits at this probability threshold.  However, 
in both lower probability threshold conditions, three additional lawsuits with a slightly 
more than remote likelihood of leading to a material loss were also disclosed in either a 
more objective manner or in a more opportunistic manner designed to persuade investors 
to view the litigation, as a whole, as less serious. 
1.5 Preview of the Results 
The results of my study suggest that, when the probability threshold is higher (i.e., 
“at least reasonably possible”), investors assess the firms‟ litigation risk consistent with 
their directional preferences.  Specifically, long investors assess the lowest and short 
investors assess the highest likelihood of firm loss, with prospective investors falling in 
between.  However, when the probability threshold is lower, adding low probability 
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lawsuits to the reasonably possible lawsuit causes prospective investors to assess a lower 
risk of loss to the disclosed litigation, even though more lawsuits are disclosed.  In 
addition, my findings suggest that firms can use an opportunistic presentation under a 
lower threshold to deflect attention from higher probability to lower probability lawsuits, 
which leads all investor types to perceive pending litigation more favorably for the firm, 
despite their directional preferences.  As such, prospective investors‟ and even short 
investors‟ judgments converge toward long investors‟ already favorable judgments when 
the disclosure threshold is lower and firms implement the opportunistic disclosure 
strategy it allows. 
 The results of my study have several important implications.  My experimental 
design allows me to test potential unintended consequences of a proposed accounting 
standard, holding other factors constant (Kachelmeier and King 2002).  These findings 
should be of interest to the FASB and other regulators as they consider modifications to 
disclosure thresholds and the form these disclosures should take.  Although the FASB‟s 
goal in its exposure draft is to help investors make better judgments, these results should 
inform the FASB, as well as investors, that investors‟ cognitive and motivational biases 
may cause them to incorporate additional low probability lawsuits in a sub-optimal 
manner.  My study also has implications concerning the form that disclosures should 
take.  Under the lower threshold, managers would have both the incentive and the 
discretion to report opportunistically.  My findings suggest such an opportunistic 
presentation can persuade all investors (long, prospective, and short) to view the litigation 
less critically.  Therefore, it would be prudent for investors to remain attentive for 
management‟s persuasion attempts in an effort to decrease the influence of such attempts.  
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Further, policy makers may want to more carefully contemplate whether and how 
pending litigation is disclosed, as such considerations can influence investors‟ judgments. 
 While the SFAS 5 debate provides a timely setting for studying the consequences 
of expanding disclosure requirements, my findings may inform other situations in which 
similar disclosure expansions are being considered.  For example, in 2010, the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) implemented new requirements that publicly traded 
companies disclose any risks that climate change might pose to their future operations or 
profits (SEC 2010).  Firms could choose to disclose all risks objectively (i.e., present both 
more and less remote risks in a transparent manner).  Alternatively, as this new mandate 
would require many firms to disclose more items, firms could use the new mandate to 
disclose information opportunistically (e.g., strategically disclosing a number of very 
remote risks to draw attention away from potentially more serious ones).  Therefore, 
similar unintended consequences could potentially take place in other settings in which 
disclosure requirements are expanded, opening possible avenues for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1     Introduction 
This chapter reviews several areas of literature to develop a framework for 
studying the effects of lowering an accounting disclosure threshold on investors‟ 
judgments about firms‟ pending litigation.  The second section discusses the recent 
debate surrounding the disclosure of loss contingencies.  The third and fourth sections 
review the motivated reasoning and the dilution effect literatures, respectively.  The fifth 
and sixth sections review the opportunistic reporting and persuasion literatures, 
respectively.  Finally, the seventh section offers concluding remarks. 
2.2     Debate over Loss Contingency Disclosures 
Under the existing accounting standard for disclosure of loss contingencies, SFAS 
5, management is required to disclose pending litigation if they believe the likelihood of a 
material loss is “at least reasonably possible” (FASB 1975).  Recently, however, 
investors have asserted that too frequently firms are not disclosing loss contingencies 
until the loss has already been realized, leaving them unable to adequately assess the risks 
that companies are facing due to pending litigation (FASB 2008; Cheney 2008).  In 
response to investors‟ claims, the FASB issued an Exposure Draft (FASB 2008) which 
proposes to lower the probability threshold for disclosure from “at least reasonably 
possible” to “more than remote.”  This would result in the disclosure of previously 
undisclosed lawsuits that fall between these two thresholds.
1
  As the FASB (2008) notes, 
                                                          
1
 Prior accounting research consistently finds that individuals judge the numerical equivalent of the phrase 
“remote” to be substantially lower than “reasonably possible” (typically around 10 percent versus 
approximately 50 to 60 percent) (Reimers 1992; Amer et al. 1994; Laswad and Mak 1997; Simon 2002).  
Further, many other verbal probability phrases have been shown to be more than remote but not reasonably 
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lowering the probability threshold for disclosure would require many firms to disclose a 
larger number of lawsuits.   
Managers and attorneys from many companies are strongly against expanding 
loss contingency disclosures.  A recent Wall Street Journal editorial noted that: “Senior 
litigators from 13 companies, including Pfizer, General Electric, DuPont, Boeing and 
McDonald‟s have signed a letter to FASB Chairman Robert Herz, objecting to the plan. 
„Too often, lawsuits are filed for publicity or to pressure companies, only to be dropped 
later,‟ they wrote” (The Wall Street Journal 2008, August 7, p. A12).  Herz later 
responded, “The new disclosures are aimed at providing information earlier to existing 
and potential investors in order to give them a greater understanding of the risks 
companies are facing.  I believe that information would improve their ability to make 
informed investment decisions” (Herz 2008).  Thus, the contentiousness of this issue 
exists, in part, because firms assert that increased disclosures will lead to lower quality 
judgments if investors do not assimilate the information appropriately, while investors 
believe that increased disclosures will lead to better judgments since they will have more 
transparent information.   
 In general, the effect of lowering an accounting threshold on users‟ judgments has 
not been studied in the accounting literature.  Thus, it is unclear how investors would 
incorporate additional low probability lawsuits into their perceptions of the likelihood of 
litigation losses.  The recent debate surrounding the proposal to lower the threshold for 
disclosure of pending litigation provides a timely setting in which to study this effect. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
possible, suggesting there is a gap along the probability continuum between these two terms (Amer et al. 
1994; Laswad and Mak 1997).  Thus, the idea of lowering the threshold for disclosure is to require firms to 
begin disclosing litigation that falls between these two probability thresholds (FASB 2008). 
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2.3     Motivated Reasoning 
 Motivated reasoning has been studied extensively in the psychology literature as 
well as a variety of other applied areas, such as accounting.  Motivated reasoning is a 
process by which a decision maker‟s preference for a particular conclusion results in a 
tendency to search for and interpret evidence in an effort to support or otherwise justify 
that conclusion (Kunda 1987, 1990, 1999; Pyszczynski & Greenberg 1987).  Because of 
this biased information search, decision makers are left with a biased set of evidence to 
interpret (Klayman and Ha 1987; Kunda 1990).  Further, motivated reasoning theory 
suggests decision makers have a tendency to interpret this evidence in a manner 
consistent with their preferred conclusions (Kunda 1990; Ditto and Lopez 1992; Kunda 
1999).  Thus, motivated reasoning results in both a biased information search and biased 
interpretation of the resulting evidence.  This tends to result in judgments that are more 
consistent with decision makers‟ preferred outcomes. 
2.3.1     Motivation to Reach an Accurate Conclusion or a Preferred Conclusion 
Motivated reasoning theory predicts that decision makers are often motivated to 
arrive at a particular preferred conclusion or at an accurate conclusion (Kunda 1990).  
Prior psychology research suggests that when decision makers have a motive to arrive at 
a preferred conclusion, they tend to engage in a biased and incomplete search for 
information while overweighting preference-consistent evidence and underweighting 
preference-inconsistent evidence (Kunda 1990; Ditto and Lopez 1992).  Conversely, 
when decision makers are motivated to be accurate, they expend more cognitive effort on 
their task, attend to and process information more carefully, and generate and evaluate 
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more hypotheses and more balanced sets of evidence (Kunda 1990; Ditto and Lopez 
1992).   
 Psychology research suggests that information consistent with decision makers‟ 
preferences tends to be accepted with less scrutiny than information inconsistent with 
their preferences (Kunda 1999).  In a well-cited study, Ditto and Lopez (1992) performed 
a series of experiments designed to test whether individuals are differentially skeptical of 
information that is preference-consistent versus preference-inconsistent.  In their first 
experiment, participants were asked to decide which student (a likable student or a 
dislikable student) was more intelligent.  The results show that participants looked at 
fewer items of information to determine that a dislikable student was less intelligent, but 
more items of information to determine that a dislikable student was more intelligent.  
However, in a control group where the students were described as equally likable (so 
participants did not hold a preferred conclusion), participants required equal information 
to make their judgment about intelligence.  These results suggest that less information is 
required to reach a preferred conclusion than a non-preferred conclusion, consistent with 
motivated reasoning theory. 
 The second experiment in the Ditto and Lopez (1992) study asked participants to 
perform a fictitious medical test to determine whether or not they had a particular enzyme 
deficiency.  The results show that participants led to believe they had the deficiency took 
more time to make their final decision about the result and were more likely to engage in 
a variety of behaviors to test and retest the validity of their result than participants led to 
believe they did not have the deficiency.  In addition, participants led to believe they had 
the deficiency subsequently judged the accuracy of the test to be lower and rated the 
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disorder as less serious and more common than participants led to believe they did not 
have the deficiency.  These results suggest that when individuals are faced with evidence 
suggestive of a conclusion they prefer not to reach, they apply more scrutiny to the 
evidence, engage in a more thorough evaluation, attempt to gather more additional 
evidence, and spend more time on the task before arriving at a final conclusion.   
A number of other psychology studies are consistent with the Ditto and Lopez 
(1992) findings.  For example, Liberman and Chaiken (1992) find that when a message 
suggesting caffeine consumption is a threat to one‟s health was highly relevant to 
participants (i.e., when they were consumers of caffeine), they were less likely to believe 
in the validity of the message and found more weaknesses and fewer strengths with the 
message than when the threatening message was irrelevant to participants (i.e., when they 
were not consumers of caffeine).  Edwards and Smith (1996) provide evidence that when 
arguments are preference-inconsistent, they are scrutinized longer and in more depth, and 
are also judged to be weaker than preference-consistent arguments.  Ditto et al. (1998) 
find that when participants received favorable medical diagnoses, their evaluations of the 
accuracy of the diagnoses were not influenced by the probability of alternative 
explanations, however, when the diagnoses were unfavorable, participants‟ accuracy 
evaluations were influenced by the probability of alternative explanations.  Lundgren and 
Prislin (1998) find that when participants are motivated to reach a directional conclusion, 
they spend more time reading arguments that are preference-consistent versus preference-
inconsistent.  Together, this literature suggests that decision makers tend to search for, 
accept, and use preference-consistent evidence more than preference inconsistent-
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evidence, and they tend to think of alternative interpretations for preference-inconsistent 
evidence and scrutinize it more. 
2.3.2     Motivated Reasoning among Auditors and Tax Professionals  
Prior accounting research suggests that auditors and tax professionals engage in 
motivated reasoning to arrive at judgments that are consistent with their preferred 
conclusions (Cuccia et al. 1995; Hackenbrack and Nelson 1996; Wilks 2002; Kadous et 
al. 2003; Kadous et al. 2008).  If preferred conclusions are sub-optimal, this can lead to 
poor judgment and decision making in a variety of accounting contexts (Bonner 2008).  
Much of the research in this area of the accounting literature has focused on situations 
where preferred conclusions are consistent with economic incentives.  For example, 
research has examined how auditors‟ and tax professionals‟ judgments are influenced by 
their clients‟ or superiors‟ preferences (Cuccia et al. 1995; Hackenbrack and Nelson 
1996; Kadous et al. 2003; Kadous et al. 2008; Wilks 2002). 
One study demonstrating motivated reasoning among auditors is Hackenbrack 
and Nelson (1996).  In their study, they manipulated engagement risk by telling auditors 
that their audit firm has either a high or a moderate exposure to fines, litigation, and loss 
of reputation regarding the audit discussed in the case.  In addition, they manipulated the 
accounting standard used in the task by providing some auditors with a task that requires 
the use of SFAS 5 and other auditors a task that requires the use of SFAS 77.  
Participants were given two alternative reporting choices (i.e., one aggressive and one 
conservative) that could be made depending on whether they believe uncollectible 
receivables are reasonably estimable.  They were told the client prefers the aggressive 
option in all conditions.  Auditors were asked to choose either the aggressive or 
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conservative reporting option as well as to rate the degree to which they believe the 
amount could be reasonably estimated.  Results indicate that auditors tended to make 
reporting decisions that were consistent with their incentives, and they used the vague 
language in accounting standards (i.e., “reasonably estimable”) to justify their position.  
When engagement risk was high, they tended to favor the conservative option under both 
accounting standards.  However, when engagement risk was lower they tended to favor 
the aggressive option.  This suggests that even though auditors are supposed to be 
independent, they engage in motivated reasoning and justify their preferred conclusions 
by using the vague language in SFAS 5 and SFAS 77 to rationalize their reporting choice.   
Kadous et al. (2003) extend Hackenbrack and Nelson (1996) by investigating 
whether requiring auditors to evaluate the quality of various accounting methods 
mitigates (as regulators predicted) or exacerbates (as motivated reasoning theory predicts) 
auditors‟ tendency to comply with clients‟ preferred methods.  Interestingly, they found 
that quality assessments actually exacerbate the influence of auditors‟ directional goals 
on their acceptance of clients‟ preferred aggressive accounting treatments. 
In addition to auditors‟ tendencies to reach the preferred conclusions of their 
clients, auditors have also been shown to adopt their superiors‟ preferred conclusions 
(Wilks 2002).  In one experimental condition, participants were told that the partner was 
concerned that, in prior years, his audit team was unduly optimistic in its evaluation of 
evidence relevant to the going-concern task, while in another experimental condition, 
they were told the partner feels past audit teams have been too pessimistic.  In addition, 
the timing of the partner‟s concern was manipulated by telling participants about the 
partner‟s concern either immediately before or after they evaluated evidence items related 
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to the going-concern task.  Participants were then asked to evaluate twenty evidence 
items pertaining to a client‟s going-concern status and then make a going-concern 
judgment.  The results indicate auditors who were told of the partner‟s concern before 
evaluating evidence judged the individual evidence items and made going-concern 
judgments that were more consistent with the partner‟s preferred conclusion than auditors 
who were told about the partner‟s concern after evaluating the evidence.  These findings 
suggest that auditors engage in directional processing of evidence when they know the 
audit partner‟s preferred conclusion prior to evidence evaluation. 
Prior accounting research has also investigated the influence of tax professionals‟ 
preferred conclusions on their judgments.  One study in this area is Cuccia et al. (1995). 
Tax professionals in this study were given a description of a tax issue, relevant guidance 
on the issue, a description of the client, and a fictitious practice standard.  Tax 
professionals‟ preferred conclusions were manipulated by describing the client as having 
either an aggressive or a conservative preference for the preparation of their taxes.  
Participants were asked to make a reporting decision (i.e., an aggressive or conservative 
choice), to make an assessment of the evidence supporting their decision, and to interpret 
the vague language used in the accounting standard.  The results suggest that tax 
professionals‟ judgments were more conservative when their client‟s preferences were 
more conservative and more aggressive when their client‟s preferences were more 
aggressive.  Results also suggest tax professionals use the intrinsic vagueness in a verbal 
accounting standard or in the facts to justify reporting decisions that are consistent with 
their client‟s preferences. 
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In more recent research, the influence of clients‟ preferred conclusions on tax 
professionals‟ judgments has been shown to be reduced when the costs of making 
inappropriate judgments are made salient (Kadous et al. 2008).  Future research may 
follow the lead of Kadous et al. (2008) by investigating other variables that may reduce 
the influence of clients‟ preferred treatments on both auditors‟ and tax professionals‟ 
judgments. 
Much of the research described above examines settings in which decision 
makers‟ preferred conclusions are also consistent with their economic incentives.  Thus, 
the cognitive influence of auditors‟ and tax professionals‟ preferred conclusions on their 
judgments is difficult to isolate when their preferred conclusions are also aligned with 
their economic incentives (e.g., adopting the preferred conclusion of a client or audit 
partner).  It is possible that auditors and tax professionals are merely rationally reacting to 
their economic incentives by interpreting evidence and making judgments consistent with 
those incentives.  Thus, the extent to which motivated reasoning in accounting settings is 
purely a rational reaction to economic incentives versus a psychological bias resulting 
from holding a preferred conclusion is difficult to determine in the auditing and tax 
contexts studied to date (Hales 2007).   
2.3.3     Motivated Reasoning among Nonprofessional Investors 
Studying the influence of directional preferences on nonprofessional investors‟ 
judgments allows researchers to separate rational reactions to economic incentives from 
the purely motivational biases predicted by motivated reasoning theory (Hales 2007).  
According to economic theories, nonprofessional investors should process information 
objectively in order to reach the most accurate conclusion about a particular investment 
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(Hales 2007).  If investors process information in a non-objective manner, it could lead to 
a sub-optimal allocation of resources within their portfolios and, therefore, lower returns. 
Prior accounting studies examining the influence of motivated reasoning goals on 
nonprofessional investors‟ judgments show that nonprofessional investors tend to make 
judgments consistent with the preferred conclusion that they will earn a positive return on 
their investment, even though they have an economic incentive to be objective (Hales 
2007; Han and Tan 2010; Thayer 2011).   
The first study that examined the influence of directional preferences on 
nonprofessional investors‟ judgments is Hales (2007).  In his study, investor participants 
were presented with a real (but unidentified) firm‟s EPS for the prior four years, along 
with excerpts from press releases, individual analysts‟ and consensus forecasts, and 
selected comments from analysts‟ reports.  Investors‟ directional preferences were 
manipulated by assigning participants to take a long or a short position in the firm.  In 
addition, half of the participants were provided with an earnings benchmark that was 
three cents above the consensus analyst forecast and the other half were provided with a 
benchmark that was three cents below the forecast.  This created the following four 
experimental conditions: (1) short investors receiving preference-inconsistent information 
(i.e., an earnings benchmark above the consensus forecast), (2) short investors receiving 
preference-consistent information (i.e., an earnings benchmark below the consensus 
forecast), (3) long investors receiving preference-inconsistent information (i.e., an 
earnings benchmark below the consensus forecast), and (4) long investors receiving 
preference-consistent information (i.e., an earnings benchmark above the consensus 
forecast).  Participants were asked to make EPS forecasts for the firm, and were given a 
19 
 
monetary incentive to be as accurate as possible by making forecasts as close to the 
firm‟s real EPS as possible.  Results suggest that investors tended to interpret information 
differently depending on their investment position in the firm (i.e., long or short), 
particularly when the information was preference-inconsistent.  This is particularly 
striking because participants also had a salient economic incentive to be objective and 
make an accurate EPS forecast.  Yet, they tended to agree with information that 
suggested they might have a profit on their investment and disagree with information that 
suggested they might have a loss, consistent with motivated reasoning theory.  Thus, 
Hales (2007) demonstrates that nonprofessional investors are influenced by their 
preferred conclusions, even when they have an economic incentive to be accurate. 
 Thayer (2011) is another related study in this literature.  In this study, 
nonprofessional investors were assigned to either a long or a short investment position.  
They were asked to choose one firm (out of two) in which to take that assigned position.  
Following Hales (2007), half of the participants are provided with an earnings benchmark 
that is four cents above the consensus analyst forecast and the other half are provided 
with a benchmark that is four cents below the forecast.  This design created four 
experimental conditions which manipulated whether the information is good news (i.e., 
preference-consistent) or bad news (i.e., preference-inconsistent) with respect to the 
profitability of the participant‟s investment position.  Participants received quarterly 
earnings information and historical stock prices for the past three years, as well as 
consensus and ranges of four individual analysts‟ forecasts for the upcoming year.  After 
receiving the preference-consistent (or preference-inconsistent) information, participants 
were given the option of searching for more information by viewing the analysts‟ detailed 
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forecasts before making a final EPS forecast for their firm.  Results suggest 
nonprofessional investors searched for a greater amount of additional information after 
receiving preference-inconsistent news about their investment than when they received 
preference-consistent news, supporting the predictions of motivated reasoning theory.   
 Han and Tan (2010) is another recent study to examine the influence of 
nonprofessional investors‟ directional preferences on their judgments.  Nonprofessional 
investors‟ directional preferences were manipulated by assigning participants to take a 
long position, a short position, or no position in a firm (i.e., a control condition similar to 
a prospective investor position).  Participants were asked to make earnings forecasts and 
investment-related judgments after receiving management‟s earnings guidance.  Both the 
valence (positive or negative news) and format (point estimate or range) of 
management‟s earnings guidance was manipulated.  The results suggest that 
nonprofessional investors‟ directional preferences influenced their interpretations of 
management‟s guidance more as the ambiguity of the guidance increased (i.e., when 
guidance was positive and provided as range).  The authors posit that the reason for this 
is likely to be because a range is ambiguous and allows long and short investors to 
interpret the range guidance in a manner consistent with their preferences.  In addition, 
since management has greater incentives to disclose good news than bad news, long 
investors receiving good news from management may take it at face value, while short 
investors may discount it as self-serving.  The results demonstrate that nonprofessional 
investors‟ judgments are influenced by the form and direction of management‟s earnings 
guidance differently depending on their motivated reasoning goals. 
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 In general, this literature suggests that nonprofessional investors process 
information differently depending on whether it is consistent or inconsistent with their 
preferred conclusions about their investment, consistent with psychology research on 
motivated reasoning.  In an investment setting, unlike generic psychology settings, this 
literature demonstrates that the influence of motivated reasoning goals persists even when 
decision makers (e.g., nonprofessional investors) have an economic incentive to evaluate 
information in an objective manner.   
2.3.4     Motivated Reasoning within Reasonableness Constraints 
 Motivated reasoning theory also suggests that the influence of decision makers‟ 
preferred conclusions will be bounded by reasonableness constraints (Pyszczynski and 
Greenberg 1987; Kunda and Sanitioso 1989; Kunda 1990, 1999).  When a preference-
consistent conclusion deviates from salient benchmarks, it becomes more difficult for 
people to justify a preferred conclusion (Pyszczynski and Greenberg 1987).  A 
sufficiently large deviation between the preferred conclusion and the information invokes 
reasonableness constraints.  That is, people do not overtly bias their judgments, but only 
reach a preferred conclusion to the extent that they can maintain an illusion of objectivity 
(Pyszczynski and Greenberg 1987; Kunda 1990).  Kunda notes (1999, p. 224), 
“Motivation can color my judgment, but we are not at liberty to conclude whatever we 
want to conclude simply because we want to.  Even when we are motivated to arrive at a 
particular conclusion, we are also motivated to be rational and to construct a justification 
for our desired conclusion that would persuade a dispassionate observer. We will draw 
our conclusion only if we can come up with enough evidence to support it.” 
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 For example, Kunda and Sanitioso (1989) demonstrate how the influence of 
motivated reasoning is bounded by reasonableness constraints.  In their study, graduate 
student participants‟ preferred conclusion was manipulated by providing them with the 
results of a fictitious study that claimed academic success is related to either extroversion 
or introversion.  Participants were then shown a number of trait adjectives on a computer 
screen one at a time.  Participants were asked to respond to each trait by selecting 
whether the trait described them or not.  The results show participants led to believe 
introversion was related to success tended to select fewer extroversion traits as self-
descriptive than did participants led to believe extraversion was related to success.  
A number of studies in the accounting literature have investigated motivated 
reasoning within reasonableness constraints.  One such study is Kadous et al. (2003).  
The findings of this study suggest that auditors‟ agreement with their clients‟ preferred 
accounting treatment increases when auditors perform a quality assessment to determine 
the most appropriate method.  However, the authors posit that this can only occur to the 
extent that the client‟s preferred treatment can be reasonably justified as a sufficiently 
acceptable method. 
Ng and Shankar (2010) investigate how advice from an audit firm‟s technical 
department and the strength of the client‟s justification for their preferred treatment 
moderate the findings of Kadous et al. (2003) by changing auditors‟ reasonableness 
constraints.  The results suggest that quality assessments do reduce auditors‟ agreement 
with their client‟s preferred treatment when the audit firm‟s technical department 
explicitly advises the use of the most appropriate method (which differs from the client‟s 
preference) and when the client‟s justification for their preferred treatment is strong.    
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The authors posit this occurs because the technical department‟s advice to use a more 
appropriate method tightens auditors‟ reasonableness constraints, making it more difficult 
for them to continue to support their client‟s preferred treatment when advised of a more 
appropriate method.  This effect is more observable when the client provides a strong 
(rather than a weak) justification for their preference because auditors are more likely to 
already agree with the client‟s preference when their arguments in favor of the treatment 
are strong.  Thus, when the client‟s justification is strong, there would be more room for 
auditors‟ agreement to decrease (as their reasonableness constraints shift) in response to 
the technical department‟s advice. 
2.4     Dilution Effect 
 The weight decision makers give to certain items of information can be diluted 
(i.e., reduced), when additional information is also considered.  For example, the dilution 
effect occurs when the presence of irrelevant information weakens the implication of 
relevant information (Nisbett et al. 1981).  The dilution effect was first documented in the 
psychology literature, but it has also been studied in applied settings, such as accounting, 
for many years.  Typically, studies on the dilution effect show that judgments made using 
both diagnostic and nondiagnostic evidence are less extreme than judgments made using 
diagnostic evidence only. For example, Nisbett et al. (1981) is an early study of the 
dilution effect.  In that study, participants predicted the GPA of a student when they were 
provided with only relevant information (i.e., they were told the student studied for either 
3 hours or 31 hours per week).  Participants moderated their judgments about the 
student‟s GPA when they also received information that pretest participants judged to be 
irrelevant (e.g., the number of plants the student kept). 
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Throughout the literature, researchers have posited that the dilution effect results 
because people use the representativeness heuristic to make likelihood assessments 
(Kahneman and Tversky 1972; Tetlock and Boettger 1989; Hackenbrack 1992; Shelton 
1999; Bonner 2008).  The representativeness heuristic is a natural cognitive strategy that 
people use to judge the likelihood of a potential event by comparing the similarity of the 
information about the potential event with other known events (Kahneman and Tversky 
1972).  According to this theory, people will judge the likelihood of a potential event by 
comparing the information about it to their mental representations of other known events.  
The more similar the information about the potential event is to people‟s mental 
representations of other known events, the higher their likelihood judgments are predicted 
to be (Nisbett et al. 1981; Zukier 1982; Tversky and Kahneman 1983; Frederick and 
Libby 1986; Tetlock and Boettger 1989; Hackenbrack 1992).   
There have been several studies in the psychology literature that have investigated 
boundary conditions of the dilution effect.  For example, Zukier and Jennings (1983) 
found that the dilution effect does not hold when the nondiagnostic information is 
extreme and atypical.  Further, other studies suggest that when people‟s beliefs about the 
diagnosticity of the information are weak, the dilution effect does not hold (Ruble and 
Stangor 1986; Higgins and Bargh 1987; Fiske and Neuberg 1990). 
In an effort to investigate methods to debias the dilution effect, psychologists 
have found a factor that unexpectedly amplifies the dilution effect.  That is, Tetlock and 
Boettger (1989) found that accountability exacerbates the dilution effect.  The authors 
suggest this probably occurs because accountability increases participants‟ complexity of 
thought.  As participants‟ thoughts become more complex and integrative, they tend to 
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suffer from the effects of dilution more because they are more attentive to all of the 
evidence provided. 
2.4.1     Dilution Effect in the Accounting Literature 
 Studies investigating the dilution effect in accounting to date are generally set in 
auditing contexts.  Recently, researchers in accounting have begun to question whether 
the dilution effects documented in auditing studies exist in other accounting settings, such 
as investment settings (Bonner 2008).   
In general, studies in the accounting literature are consistent with the dilution 
effect.  For example, Hackenbrack (1992) found evidence of the dilution effect in an 
audit setting.  He asked auditors to first make judgments about how much a company‟s 
exposure to fraudulent reporting changed during a year when they were given both 
diagnostic and nondiagnostic information.  Then, he asked them to make the same 
judgment using only diagnostic information.  Findings show that auditors‟ probability of 
fraud judgments were less extreme when both relevant and irrelevant information was 
presented than when they received only relevant information. 
Hoffman and Patton (1997) also find support for the dilution effect in an auditing 
task.  This study provides evidence that accountability does not exacerbate the dilution 
effect among auditors.  The authors argue this probably resulted since auditors tended to 
make more conservative judgments when held accountable since they are trained to be 
conservative and likely anticipate their superiors‟ preference for conservative judgments.  
This result is contrary to the findings of Tetlock and Boettger (1989) in the psychology 
literature, who suggest that accountability exacerbates the dilution effect.  However, in 
generic psychology studies participants could not anticipate the preferences of those to 
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whom they were accountable, which could explain the reason for these divergent findings 
across disciplines. 
Prior work in this area of the accounting literature has found factors that moderate 
the dilution effect.  For example, Glover (1997) found that accountability had no 
influence on the dilution effect, but that when auditors were put under time pressure, the 
dilution effect was reduced but not eliminated.  Shelton (1999) found that the dilution 
effect was moderated by experience in an audit going concern judgment task.  Auditors 
with different levels of experience were asked to make a going concern judgment either 
with only diagnostic evidence or with both diagnostic evidence and nondiagnostic 
evidence.  The results suggest that audit seniors‟ judgments suffer from dilution but audit 
managers‟ and partners‟ judgments do not.  This suggests that, as people gain expertise in 
a field, they may become better at filtering out irrelevant information and only 
incorporate relevant information into their judgments. 
In general, findings in accounting are consistent with the dilution effect; however 
there are some inconsistencies between the psychology findings and findings in auditing 
settings.  These inconsistencies are likely due to the unique audit environment.  Since the 
studies that have been done on the dilution effect in accounting are mostly in audit 
settings, future research should investigate dilution effects in other accounting settings, 
such as investment tasks.  This would enable accounting researchers to further develop a 
theory of dilution (Bonner 2008). 
2.5     Opportunistic Reporting by Management 
For a number of reasons (e.g., power, obtaining goals, being liked), we prefer to 
present ourselves in the most favorable light possible to manage others‟ impressions of us 
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(Baumeister 1982; Leary and Kowalski 1990; Nezlek and Leary 2002; Fiske and Taylor 
2008).  Similarly, managers of firms also prefer to present themselves and their firms in a 
favorable light (Baginski et al. 2000; Schrand and Walther 2000).  Hackenbrack and 
Nelson (1996, p. 43) note, “Managers have incentives to use accounting standards to 
report in ways that are in their best interest, even at the expense of stakeholders.”  
Bloomfield (2002, p. 238) also notes, “Managers make many decisions motivated, at least 
partly, by a desire to make it harder for investors to uncover information that the 
managers do not want to affect their firms‟ stock prices.”   
Management‟s propensity for opportunistic reporting is a well documented and 
commonly studied in the accounting literature both experimentally and archivally 
(Hackenbrack and Nelson 1996; Baginski et al. al 2000; Schrand and Walther 2000; 
Bloomfield 2002; Barton and Mercer 2005; Krische 2005; Hirst et al. 2007).  For 
example, Baginski et al. (2000) report archival evidence suggesting management tends to 
explain bad news in voluntary disclosures by attributing it to external factors outside of 
management‟s control, but they tend to attribute internal causes to good news. Thus, 
managers appear willing to take credit for things that go right, but distance themselves 
from things that go wrong.   
Barton and Mercer (2005) experimentally investigated how financial analysts 
react to management‟s external attributions for bad news.  They provided financial 
analysts with historical financial statement information showing a firm that experienced 
poor performance over the year.  Two groups of analysts received management‟s 
explanation for the poor performance, which provided an external cause for the bad news. 
For half of the participants, management‟s explanation was plausible, and for the other 
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half, the explanation was implausible.  There was also a control group that did not receive 
any explanation from management.  Results show that when management‟s external 
attributions were plausible, analysts made higher stock price judgments and earnings 
forecasts than when the attributions were implausible.  This suggests that if management 
provides implausible external attributions for bad news in voluntary disclosures in an 
attempt to persuade investors, it may not work as intended by management.  Instead, it 
may backfire among professional investors (e.g., analysts).   
Further evidence of managers‟ tendencies to be opportunistic is provided by 
Schrand and Walther (2000).  They present archival evidence suggesting that managers 
strategically select the prior-period earnings benchmark that they use to compare to 
current earnings.  Managers appear to be more likely to remind investors of a prior loss 
than a prior gain.  Including prior period losses but not prior period gains in an earnings 
benchmark creates a lower benchmark which is used to compare to current earnings.  
This creates the perception of a larger positive change in earnings.  After providing 
evidence of management‟s opportunistic choice of benchmark, the authors also provide 
archival evidence that investors appear to be influenced by management‟s strategic 
choice of benchmark.  They provide an analysis of excess stock returns at the earnings 
announcement date which suggests investors use the benchmark that managers provide to 
evaluate current earnings. 
Krishe (2005) experimentally investigates why managers‟ strategic choice of 
earnings benchmark influences investors‟ judgments.  Results suggest that 
nonprofessional investors‟ evaluations of a firm‟s current period earnings were 
influenced by whether or not management used earnings benchmarks which strategically 
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included prior period losses but not prior period gains.  These results are consistent with 
the archival evidence provided by Schrand and Walther (2000).  Further, results suggest 
that the effect seems to be driven by limitations in nonprofessional investors‟ memories 
for the prior period gain or loss.  Results also suggest that when management reminds 
investors of the prior period gain or loss in the current period earnings announcement, 
this effect is reduced.  In general, this stream of research suggests that nonprofessional 
investors are influenced by the opportunistic disclosures of managers. 
2.6     Methods of Persuasion 
There are many theories of persuasion that have been studied in basic disciplines 
such as psychology and in applied disciplines such as accounting, marketing, and 
political science.  For example, Emphasis Framing Theory (e.g., Nelson et al. 1997; 
Druckman 2001) is a persuasion theory primarily developed in the political science 
literature, and the Persuasion Knowledge Model (e.g., Friestad and Wright 1994) is a 
persuasion theory primarily developed in the marketing literature.  Although individual 
persuasion theories differ in their specific predictions, they are all concerned with how a 
person‟s attitudes or behaviors can be changed by the social influence of others (Bonner 
2008; Fiske and Taylor 2008).  Emphasis Framing Theory and the Persuasion Knowledge 
Model are discussed in the following sub-sections.  These theories have divergent 
predictions about how investors‟ positions in a firm would influence how they respond to 
management‟s opportunistic legal disclosures. 
2.6.1     Emphasis Framing 
 Emphasis framing theory suggests communicators can influence others‟ opinions 
by emphasizing particular considerations over other relevant considerations when giving 
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their interpretation of an issue (Nelson et al. 1997; Nelson and Oxley 1999; Druckman 
2001; McCaffery and Baron 2004; Maule and Villejoubert 2007; Slothuus 2008).  For 
example, a politician may strategically emphasize a particular issue (e.g., the economy), 
over other relevant issues (e.g., foreign policy) during a campaign.  Assuming economic 
issues are a strength of the politician, framing the campaign around the economy may 
allow the politician to persuade voters to perceive the economy as an important aspect of 
the election and, in turn, make them more likely to vote for this candidate.   
 Emphasis framing theory has been primarily studied in the political science 
literature.  Nelson et al. (1997) examined emphasis framing effects by asking 
undergraduate students to make judgments about the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) after 
watching a local news story about a recent KKK rally.  The researchers manipulated the 
frame of the news story by reporting the rally in terms of the KKK‟s right to free speech 
or in terms of the KKK‟s disruption of public order.  In the free speech frame, the 
reporter emphasized the right of KKK members to speak in public and the right of their 
supporters and the public to listen to what they had to say.  In the disruption of public 
order frame, the reporter emphasized the disturbances that ensued during the rally which 
included visuals of police officers in riot gear.  Interestingly, when the news story was 
framed in terms of free speech, participants‟ judgments tended to be more tolerant of the 
KKK than when it was framed as a disruption of public order. The results of this study 
suggest that by strategically emphasizing a particular relevant aspect of an issue, 
communicators are able to influence individuals‟ judgments in a particular direction. 
 Nelson et al. (1997) note that, with emphasis framing, communicators of 
politically persuasive messages “devote considerable effort toward influencing not only 
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what information gets on the air but how it is presented” (Nelson et al. 1997, p. 224).  A 
communicator may introduce individuals to aspects of an issue that they were not 
previously aware of, or were not previously considering, by framing an issue with a 
subset of relevant information.  Entman (1993) notes that framing effects depend on the 
recipient‟s cognitive schemata.  For example, Druckman finds that, while they still exist, 
emphasis framing effects are less pronounced among people with expertise than without 
expertise in the domain.    
In general, this stream of research in the political science literature suggests that 
emphasis framing effects are most prominent when the target of the message is not an 
expert on the issue.  This suggests that nonprofessional investors may be particularly 
prone to emphasis framing effects in financial disclosures due to their lack of expertise in 
the subject matter.  
2.6.1.1     Emphasis Framing in Accounting Contexts 
 There are a few recent studies that investigate emphasis framing effects in 
accounting settings (Tan and Yip-Ow 2001; McCaffery and Baron 2004; Shankar and 
Tan 2006; Lambert and Agoglia 2010).  These studies have investigated emphasis 
framing in audit review and tax settings.  To date, there has not been any emphasis 
framing studies done in investment contexts.  In general, these studies suggest that 
auditors and tax professionals are persuaded by emphasis framing in certain accounting 
contexts, but research on these effects in the accounting literature is just beginning. 
Tan and Yip-Ow (2001) examine audit preparers‟ use of emphasis framing to 
stylize workpapers that persuade reviewers.  They used an experiment in which 
participants reviewed the work of an audit preparer who had either concluded that the 
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client‟s major customer‟s account was either collectable or uncollectable.  The 
participants were also provided workpapers that emphasized evidence which supported 
the preparer‟s conclusion and downplayed evidence that did not support the conclusion or 
workpapers with evidence that was not framed.  Participants used the workpapers and 
conclusion provided by the preparer to make their own assessment about the 
collectability of a customer‟s account.  Results suggest that reviewers placed less weight 
on the preparer‟s conclusion when the workpapers were stylized versus neutral.  This 
suggests that reviewers may see through preparers‟ stylization attempts and do not seem 
to suffer from emphasis framing effects in this setting.  However, this finding appears to 
be at odds with what would be expected based on emphasis framing theory from the 
political science and mass media literatures.  It is also somewhat inconsistent with other 
recent auditing research which suggests that reviewers are often not very good at 
adjusting for shortcomings in preparers‟ workpapers, and thus would be likely to suffer 
from emphasis framing effects (Agoglia et al. 2009a; Agoglia et al. 2009b).  These 
inconsistencies could be due to the subtle nature of the framing manipulation in Tan and 
Yip-Ow (2001).  However, the underlying reasons could be investigated in future 
research. 
 A more recent study on emphasis framing in the accounting literature is Shankar 
and Tan (2006).  This study examines the nature and extent of audit preparers‟ workpaper 
justifications when their conclusions are either similar or dissimilar to a reviewer‟s 
preferred conclusion.  After reading case materials, auditors were asked to make an initial 
assessment about whether to allow a client to provide footnote disclosure regarding the 
collectability of accounts receivable or to require an allowance for doubtful accounts. 
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Then, the next day, participants were informed of the reviewer‟s preferred treatment.  
Participants were then asked to write a memo to the reviewer justifying their assessment 
(made the day before) about the appropriate accounting treatment to use.  Participants‟ 
tacit managerial knowledge and technical knowledge were measured independent 
variables.  The results show that audit preparers with high tacit managerial knowledge 
were more likely than preparers with low tacit managerial knowledge to use emphasis 
framing to strategically present audit evidence to support their conclusion when the 
reviewer prefers the same accounting treatment.  Technical knowledge did not moderate 
this effect.  These results suggest that audit preparers with high tacit managerial 
knowledge use emphasis framing to persuade reviewers with similar preferences by using 
language that emphasizes evidence that supports the their preferred conclusion, while 
downplaying evidence that does not support their preferred conclusion. 
 Lambert and Agoglia (2010) examine emphasis framing in an audit review 
context.  Participants‟ task involved closing review notes on audit workpapers.  The 
review was either completed in a timely manner or with a time delay.  After the review 
was completed, participants were presented with seven review notes, four of which 
contained a framing manipulation.  Holding the reviewer‟s directive constant, the review 
notes were framed by either emphasizing the importance of documentation in the 
workpapers or by emphasizing the importance of drawing an appropriate conclusion.  
The results suggest that conclusion-framed review notes resulted in greater effort levels 
among preparers while closing the notes than documentation-framed review notes, but 
only when the review was timely. This study demonstrates that the way an audit reviewer 
frames review notes influences how preparers respond to their review notes. 
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2.6.2     Persuasion Knowledge Model 
Another theory that may predict how nonprofessional investors holding particular 
investment positions in a firm react to opportunistic disclosures is the Persuasion 
Knowledge Model (PKM).  PKM predicts how people cope with the persuasion attempts 
of others (Friestad and Wright 1994).  This theory describes targets of persuasion as 
“resourceful participants who pursue their own goals” in the interpretation of a persuasive 
message and not merely passive information processors (Friestad and Wright 1994, p. 3).  
Targets of a persuasive message are posited to consider their own goals or desired 
outcomes and to select coping mechanisms that will enable them reach their goals 
(Friestad and Wright 1994; Kirmani and Campbell 2004).   
Consumers are thought to develop persuasion knowledge throughout life (Friestad 
and Wright 1994).  Persuasion knowledge is suspicion about marketers‟ ulterior motives 
(Kirmani and Zhu 2007).  Targets of persuasive messages are hypothesized to draw upon 
their own persuasion knowledge to identify when a communicator is attempting to 
persuade them (Friestad and Wright 1994; Kirmani and Zhu 2007).  Importantly, PKM 
predicts that targets will not always use coping mechanisms to try to resist persuasion 
attempts.  Instead they may be receptive to persuasion attempts if that information allows 
them to reach their goals (Friestad and Wright 1994).   
Campbell and Kirmani (2000) found that consumers apply their persuasion 
knowledge to cope with the persuasion attempts of salespeople when salespeople‟s 
persuasion motives are more salient to them.  When salespeople‟s motives are more 
salient, deep processing of the message is not necessary for consumers to use their 
persuasion knowledge to process the interaction.  However, when salespeople‟s 
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persuasion motives are less salient to consumers, their use of persuasion knowledge 
involves higher-order reasoning that requires they engage in deeper processing of the 
interaction.  In general, the results suggest that a target‟s persuasion knowledge is more 
likely to be activated when the target expends more effort processing the persuasive 
message.   
Kirmani and Zhu (2007) extend the work of Campbell and Kirmani (2000).  Their 
study suggests that even when holding depth of processing constant, persuasion 
knowledge can influence consumers‟ judgments differently depending on motivational 
factors.  Kirmani and Zhu (2007) examine the effect of an interesting motivational factor, 
regulatory focus, on consumers‟ activation of persuasion knowledge.  Regulatory focus is 
the relationship between the motivation of a person and the way in which they achieve 
their goal (Higgins et al. 1994).  That is, people are thought to be motivated to reach their 
goals in a way that either focuses on maximizing gains (i.e., promotion-focus) or focuses 
on minimizing losses (i.e., prevention-focus).  Promotion-focused people perceive their 
goals as hopes and aspirations (e.g., I want to purchase a superior product, so I eagerly 
process positive information about the product), while prevention-focused people 
perceive their goals as duties and obligations (e.g., I want to purchase a superior product, 
so I must be vigilant and make sure I process negative information about the product).  
Promotion-focused people are more likely to focus on positive signals in information that 
allow them to reach their goals.  In contrast, prevention-focused people are more likely to 
focus on negative signals in information that would prevent them from reaching their 
goal.  Kirmani and Zhu (2007) manipulate consumers‟ regulatory focus by priming 
participants to either think about their hopes, dreams, and ideals or to think about their 
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duties, obligations, and responsibilities prior to assessing an advertisement.  They also 
manipulated the salience of the advertiser‟s persuasive intent within the advertisement to 
be low, medium, or high.  They asked participants to assess their attitude toward the 
advertised brand and their perceived quality of the brand.  They also gathered measures 
of participants‟ persuasion knowledge through a skepticism scale and thought protocols. 
They found that when the advertiser‟s persuasive intent is medium or high, prevention-
focused consumers are more likely to activate their persuasion knowledge than 
promotion-focused consumers.  The results of this study suggest that motivational factors 
can influence how consumers‟ interpret persuasive advertising messages through 
differential activation of persuasion knowledge.   
Another related study in this literature is Kirmani and Campbell (2004).  They 
provide qualitative evidence about how consumers respond to salespeople‟s persuasion 
attempts.  They find that consumers‟ relationships with salespeople and experience with 
persuasion interactively affect consumers‟ coping strategies.  They conceptualize 
consumers as either “goal seekers” or “persuasion sentries”.  Goal seekers attempt to use 
the salesperson to achieve their own goals, whereas persuasion sentries attempt to guard 
against unwanted persuasion attempts.  They find that consumers are more likely to be 
goal seekers when they have a cooperative or highly dependent relationship with 
salespeople.  In contrast, consumers are more likely to be sentries when they have a 
competitive or a task-oriented relationship with salespeople. The results of Kirmani and 
Zhu (2007) have been tied to Kirmani and Campbell (2004).  That is, sentry strategies 
may be more likely to be used when consumers have a prevention-focus and seeker 
strategies may be more likely to be used when consumers have a promotion-focus. 
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In general, these results suggest that people with different motivations may be 
differentially persuaded by a message.  Since long, short, and prospective investors hold 
different motivations with respect to a particular firm, they may be differentially 
persuaded by management‟s opportunistic disclosures if PKM is a descriptive theory in 
investment settings. 
2.6.2.1     Persuasion Knowledge Model in the Accounting Literature 
 Most of the studies that have examined PKM have been marketing studies.  
However, there have been a few studies in the accounting literature that have used PKM 
to test predictions about how auditors and managers make judgments using persuasive 
information. 
For example, Rich et al. (1997) characterizes the audit review process from a 
persuasion perspective that is based on the persuasion knowledge model.  During the 
review process, audit preparers are likely to present stylized workpapers to audit 
reviewers in order to persuade reviewers that the work performed and conclusions 
reached by the preparer are appropriate and justified.  This study describes a number of 
persuasion tactics that preparers can use to stylize their workpapers such as a biased 
selection, ordering, and framing of evidence.  The researchers also posit that audit 
reviewers may learn coping strategies to deal with the persuasion attempts put forth by 
preparers, but that reviewers may also be “co-composers” of the persuasive message 
started by preparers as reviewers‟ work, in turn, is passed on to a superior.  Consistent 
with PKM, the authors theorize that reviewers‟ selection of coping mechanisms depends 
on their own goals. 
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Kadous et al. (2005) also draw upon the persuasion knowledge model in 
developing their model of how quantified information influences managers‟ judgments.  
The researchers note that conventional wisdom suggests that quantified information is 
more persuasive than non-quantified information.  However, they suggest that according 
to PKM this may not always be the case.  They develop and test a model in a setting 
where a manager is writing a proposal intended to persuade colleagues to postpone 
routine, but expensive, maintenance on machinery.  The results of this study suggest that 
managers will draw upon their persuasion knowledge to cope with the persuasion 
attempts of colleagues presenting proposals.  The extent of their coping strategies 
depends on contextual factors related to the source of the message and the objectivity of 
the information underlying the message itself. 
Kaplan et al. (2008) is a recent auditing study suggesting that, as auditors become 
more experienced, they develop persuasion knowledge which allows them to cope with 
their clients‟ persuasion attempts.  This study demonstrates that, as auditors gain 
professional experience, they tend to be less accepting of management‟s self-serving 
persuasive messages, presumably because auditors gain persuasion knowledge 
throughout their careers. 
2.7     Conclusions 
In this chapter I have reviewed the literature from accounting, psychology, 
marketing, political science, and other fields that is relevant to motivated reasoning 
theory, the dilution effect, management‟s opportunistic reporting behavior, emphasis 
framing theory, and the persuasion knowledge model.  In the following chapter, I use this 
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research to build hypotheses.  I will also describe the experimental method I use to test 
these hypotheses in the subsequent chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3 
HYPOTHESES AND METHODOLOGY 
3.1     Introduction 
This chapter develops hypotheses and discusses the methods I used to test my 
hypotheses.  The second section draws upon relevant theory and prior research to develop 
the hypotheses.  The third section discusses the experimental methods that I used to test 
my hypotheses.   
3.2 Development of Hypotheses 
 
3.2.1 Debate over SFAS 5: Threshold for Disclosing Loss Contingencies 
 
 Under the current accounting standard for disclosure of loss contingencies, SFAS 
5, management must disclose pending lawsuits if they believe the likelihood of a material 
loss is “at least reasonably possible” (FASB 1975).  Recently, however, investors have 
asserted that too often firms are not disclosing loss contingencies until the loss has 
already been realized, leaving them unable to appropriately assess the risks that 
companies are facing due to pending litigation (FASB 2008; Desir et al. 2010).  In 
response to investors‟ assertions, the FASB issued an Exposure Draft (FASB 2008) 
which proposes to lower the probability threshold for disclosure from “at least reasonably 
possible” to “more than remote.”  This would result in the disclosure of previously 
undisclosed lawsuits that fall between these two thresholds.
2
  As the FASB (2008) notes, 
                                                          
2
 Recall that prior accounting research consistently finds that individuals judge the numerical equivalent of 
the phrase “remote” to be substantially lower than “reasonably possible” (typically around 10 percent 
versus approximately 50 to60 percent) (Reimers 1992; Amer et al. 1994; Laswad and Mak 1997; Simon 
2002).  Further, many other verbal probability phrases have been shown to be more than remote but not 
reasonably possible, suggesting there is a gap along the probability continuum between these two terms 
(Amer et al. 1994; Laswad and Mak 1997).  Thus, the idea of lowering the threshold for disclosure is to 
require firms to begin disclosing litigation that falls between these two probability thresholds (FASB 2008). 
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lowering the probability threshold for disclosure in this way would require many firms to 
disclose a greater number of lawsuits.   
Managers and attorneys from many companies are strongly opposed to expanding 
loss contingency disclosures.  A recent Wall Street Journal editorial noted that: “Senior 
litigators from 13 companies, including Pfizer, General Electric, DuPont, Boeing and 
McDonald‟s have signed a letter to FASB Chairman Robert Herz, objecting to the plan. 
„Too often, lawsuits are filed for publicity or to pressure companies, only to be dropped 
later,‟ they wrote” (The Wall Street Journal 2008, August 7, p. A12).  Herz later 
responded, “The new disclosures are aimed at providing information earlier to existing 
and potential investors in order to give them a greater understanding of the risks 
companies are facing.  I believe that information would improve their ability to make 
informed investment decisions” (Herz 2008).  Thus, the contentiousness of this issue 
exists, in part, because firms argue that increased disclosures will lead to worse 
judgments if investors do not incorporate the information appropriately, while investors 
believe that increased disclosures will lead to better judgments since they will have more 
transparent information.   
3.2.2 Investors’ Motivated Reasoning Goals and Economic Incentives 
Motivated reasoning theory suggests that decision makers often either have a 
motive to arrive at a particular preferred conclusion or an accurate conclusion (Kunda 
1990).  Prior psychology research suggests that when decision makers have a motive to 
arrive at a preferred conclusion, they tend to conduct a biased and incomplete search for 
information while overweighting preference-consistent evidence and underweighting 
preference-inconsistent evidence (Kunda 1990; Ditto and Lopez 1992).  Conversely, 
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when decision makers are motivated to be accurate, they expend more cognitive effort on 
their task, attend to and process information more carefully, and generate and evaluate 
more hypotheses and more balanced sets of evidence (Kunda 1990; Ditto and Lopez 
1992).  While increased cognitive effort has been shown to improve judgment quality in 
many circumstances, it also has been shown to amplify certain judgment biases (Tetlock 
and Boettger 1989; Hackenbrack 1992; Hoffman and Patton 1997).    
Prior accounting research suggests that auditors, managers, tax professionals, and 
investors engage in motivated reasoning to arrive at judgments that are consistent with 
their preferred conclusions (Wilks 2002; Kadous et al. 2003; Hales 2007; Kadous et al. 
2008; Han and Tan 2010; Ng and Shankar 2010; Peecher et al. 2010; Thayer 2011).  
Motivated reasoning among investors is a particularly interesting phenomenon because 
investors also have a concurrent economic incentive to reach the most objective 
conclusion about the investment value of a particular firm (Hales 2007).  Objectivity is 
economically important to investors because processing information in a non-objective 
manner could lead to a sub-optimal allocation of resources within their portfolios and, 
therefore, lower returns.   
3.2.3 Prospective Investors’ Judgments and Lowering the Disclosure Threshold 
Consistent with their economic incentives, prospective investors have a motivated 
reasoning goal to reach an objective conclusion when evaluating a potential firm (Han 
and Tan 2010).  Since they have not yet made an investment decision, they should not 
hold a preferred conclusion about a particular stock.  Under the existing SFAS 5 
threshold, the disclosed lawsuit has an “at least reasonably possible” likelihood of leading 
to a material loss.  Thus, I expect that under this disclosure threshold, prospective 
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investors‟ judgments will represent a relatively objective probability assessment of the 
“at least reasonably possible” lawsuit and will not be directionally biased by a particular 
preferred conclusion.     
However, under a lower disclosure threshold such as the one proposed by the 
FASB (2008), firms would be required to disclose additional low probability lawsuits.  
Prior research in psychology and accounting suggests that disclosure of additional low 
probability lawsuits may dilute the influence of the reasonably possible lawsuit, leading 
prospective investors to assess the risk of litigation lower even though more lawsuits are 
disclosed (Nisbett et al. 1981; Tetlock and Boettger 1989; Hackenbrack 1992; Glover 
1997; Hoffman and Patton 1997; Shelton 1999).   
Specifically, adding remote losses to a disclosure may dilute, rather than add to, 
the impact of reasonably possible losses if investors rely on the representativeness 
heuristic when assessing the overall risk of loss due to disclosed litigation.  The 
representativeness heuristic is a natural cognitive strategy that people use to judge the 
likelihood of a potential event by comparing the similarity of the information about the 
potential event with other known events (Kahneman and Tversky 1972).  If information 
about the potential event is sufficiently similar to other known events, people tend to 
judge the potential event as more likely to occur.  According to this theory, prospective 
investors will judge a firm‟s likelihood of material loss (i.e., likelihood of the potential 
event) by comparing the firm‟s litigation disclosures (i.e, the information about the 
potential event) to their mental representations of lawsuits that generally lead to material 
losses (i.e., other known events).  The more similar the firm‟s disclosures are to 
prospective investors‟ mental representations of lawsuits that generally lead to material 
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losses, the higher their perceptions of the firm‟s litigation risk are predicted to be (Nisbett 
et al. 1981; Tetlock and Boettger 1989; Hackenbrack 1992).   
For example, a higher probability lawsuit (i.e., a reasonably possible lawsuit), is 
consistent with the mental representation of a lawsuit that generally leads to a material 
loss.  However, additional low probability lawsuits are inconsistent with the mental 
representation of lawsuits that generally lead to a material loss.  If investors rely on the 
representativeness heuristic to form their overall perceptions of firm loss, they may not 
view additional, remote losses as adding to the reasonably possible loss, but rather 
lowering the similarity between the overall disclosure and prospective investors‟ mental 
representations of lawsuits that generally lead to material losses. As a result, they will 
judge the firm‟s exposure to loss from the disclosed litigation lower, even though more 
lawsuits are disclosed. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
H1:  Prospective investors will judge the risk from disclosed litigation lower 
under the lower “more than remote” threshold than under the higher “at least 
reasonably possible” threshold, even though additional lawsuits are disclosed. 
 
3.2.4 Long and Short Investors’ Judgments: Motivated Reasoning within 
Reasonableness Constraints   
 
Motivated reasoning theory suggests that when decision makers are motivated to 
arrive at a particular preferred conclusion, they employ cognitive strategies that enable 
them to reach their directional goals (Kunda 1990).  When investors take a long or a short 
position in a firm, theory and prior research suggest they hold the preferred conclusion 
that they will realize a positive return on their investment, and thus, that their investment 
decision was sound (Hales 2007; Han and Tan 2010; Thayer 2011).  Consistent with their 
preferences for higher profitability and share price, long investors are motivated to 
interpret litigation disclosures as more favorable to the firm, while short investors (who 
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require lower share prices in order to profit) are motivated to interpret litigation 
disclosures as less favorable.  When judging the likelihood of loss under the higher SFAS 
5 threshold, I expect that long and short investors will interpret the “at least reasonably 
possible” lawsuit in a manner consistent with their respective directional goals (cf. Kunda 
1990; Hales 2007; Han and Tan 2010; Thayer 2011).  Thus, long investors are likely to 
assess lower litigation risks than short investors under the existing SFAS 5 threshold. 
Motivated reasoning theory also suggests that the influence of decision makers‟ 
preferred conclusions will be bounded by reasonableness constraints (Kunda 1990).  That 
is, people do not overtly bias their judgments, but only reach a preferred conclusion to the 
extent that they can maintain an illusion of objectivity (Pyszczynski and Greenberg 1987; 
Kunda 1990).  For example, while long (short) investors are motivated to view 
disclosures in a more favorable (unfavorable) light, the potential for actual investment 
losses also provides strong pressure to maintain some sense of reasonableness in their 
beliefs about an investment rather than simply believing what they want to believe about 
it (Hales 2007).  When factors are present that make reasonableness constraints more 
salient in settings such as these, directional motivated reasoning goals (while strong) can 
also become quickly bounded (Peecher et al. 2010).  Thus, investors‟ long or short 
positions can provide them with strong directional goals that will likely bias their 
judgments, but can also provide them with similarly strong reasonableness constraints 
that limit further motivated reasoning (see Figure 1). 
 Under the lower disclosure threshold, long and short investors will be motivated 
to view the likelihood of future losses consistent with their directional preferences,  
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FIGURE 1 
Investors’ Motivated Reasoning 
within Reasonableness Constraints  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: 
When directional goal strength is low, directional goals have little observable influence 
on investors‟ litigation risk judgments.  As directional goal strength increases along the 
X-axis, investors will increasingly engage in motivated reasoning, with long (short) 
investors decreasing (increasing) their judgments until they approach their reasonableness 
constraint at which point they can no longer justify further decreases (increases) (see also 
Kadous et al. 2003, Figure 1). 
 
 
subject to reasonableness constraints.  As Kunda (1990) notes, individuals tend to 
selectively use, interpret, and weight additional information, and use other cognitive 
heuristics, in ways that support their directional preferences (see also Wilks 2002).  Thus, 
under the lower disclosure threshold, long and short investors are likely to selectively 
search for and assimilate newly disclosed information about additional, relatively 
inconsequential lawsuits in a manner consistent with their motivated reasoning goals.  
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For example, long investors could selectively focus constraints (Figure 1).  However, if 
they are not already at the bounds of their reasonableness constraints under the higher 
disclosure threshold, there would be room for their judgments to move in the directions 
consistent with their respective motivated reasoning goals.  This leads to the following 
hypotheses: 
H2a:  Long investors‟ judgments of litigation risk under the lower “more than 
remote” threshold will be less than or equal to their judgments under the higher 
“at least reasonably possible” threshold. 
 
H2b:  Short investors‟ judgments of litigation risk under the lower “more than 
remote” threshold will be greater than or equal to their judgments under the 
higher “at least reasonably possible” threshold. 
 
3.2.5 Opportunism in Financial Reporting 
 
For a variety of reasons (e.g., power, obtaining goals, being liked), we prefer to 
present ourselves in the most favorable light possible to manage others‟ impressions of us 
(Baumeister 1982; Leary and Kowalski 1990; Nezlek and Leary 2002; Fiske and Taylor 
2008).  Similarly, managers of firms also prefer to present themselves and their firms in a 
favorable light (Baginski et al. 2000; Schrand and Walther 2000).  Prior accounting 
research suggests that management tends to behave opportunistically when disclosing 
information (Hackenbrack and Nelson 1996; Baginski et al. 2000; Schrand and Walther 
2000; Bloomfield 2002; Barton and Mercer 2005; Krische 2005; Hirst et al. 2007).  For 
example, Baginski et al. (2000) report archival evidence suggesting managers tend to 
explain bad news in voluntary disclosures by attributing it to temporary external factors 
outside of their control, possibly to persuade investors to interpret the bad news more 
favorably.  Also, Schrand and Walther (2000) provide archival evidence suggesting 
managers are more likely to include a prior-period loss than a prior-period gain in the 
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earnings benchmark they use to compare to current earnings, presumably to strategically 
create the perception of the largest positive change possible. 
The proposed changes to SFAS 5 lend themselves to a specific type of 
opportunistic reporting that is unique to settings in which thresholds are lowered.  Since 
lowering the disclosure threshold would cause firms to disclose additional low 
probability lawsuits, firms can use this to their advantage.  Specifically, since the FASB‟s 
amendment does not specify how the disclosures should be presented, managers could 
portray the entire disclosure as a portfolio consisting mostly of remote, and therefore 
frivolous, lawsuits that they only disclose to comply with the proposed rule.  Such a 
presentation strategy would be consistent with the view that managers have already 
expressed regarding lower probability lawsuits (e.g., that they are often frivolous or filed 
solely for publicity purposes (The Wall Street Journal 2008)).  Without changing the 
fundamental information they provide about each lawsuit, managers could focus attention 
away from reasonably possible lawsuits to the more remote ones. 
3.2.6 Opportunistic Presentation: Persuasion Knowledge Model versus Emphasis 
Framing 
 
It is unclear a priori whether or not such a persuasion attempt would work as 
managers intend.  The Persuasion Knowledge Model predicts that an opportunistic 
presentation may successfully persuade investors only when it helps them reach their 
directional conclusions (i.e., long investors), but it may backfire when it is inconsistent 
with their directional conclusions (i.e., short investors).  Alternatively, Emphasis Framing 
Theory predicts an opportunistic presentation may successfully persuade investors, 
despite their motivated reasoning goals, to view pending litigation more favorably.   
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3.2.6.1.     The Persuasion Knowledge Model  
 The Persuasion Knowledge Model (PKM) predicts that investors will be 
persuaded by management‟s opportunism if it allows them to reach their preferred 
conclusions.  PKM is a theory developed in the marketing literature that predicts how 
people cope with the persuasion attempts of others (Friestad and Wright 1994).  Targets 
of a persuasive message are described as not merely passive information processors, but 
rather as resourceful participants who consider their own goals or desired outcomes and 
select coping mechanisms that will enable them reach their goals (Friestad and Wright 
1994; Kirmani and Campbell 2004).  PKM predicts that targets will not always actively 
resist persuasion attempts, but instead may be receptive to persuasion attempts if it allows 
them to reach their own goals (Friestad and Wright 1994).   
Investors taking a long position in a firm want to believe management‟s 
opportunism is earnest, as it helps them reach their preferred conclusion (i.e., that the 
company they have invested in will perform strongly).  PKM predicts that long investors 
will be less likely to actively guard against management‟s opportunistic persuasion 
attempt and, thus, are likely to be persuaded by it (Campbell and Kirmani 2000).  In 
contrast, short investors want to believe the company will not perform strongly, which is 
contrary to management‟s interpretation.  Short investors are more likely to spend greater 
effort critically processing management‟s opportunism, and thus more likely to perceive 
management‟s presentation as a persuasion attempt (Friestad and Wright 1994; Campbell 
and Kirmani 2000).  If so, PKM predicts management‟s opportunism will backfire for 
short investors and lead them to further increase their loss likelihood judgments (Friestad 
and Wright 1994).  Since prospective investors are motivated to be objective, they are 
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likely to continue to remain fairly neutral with respect to management‟s persuasion 
attempts and, in turn, objectively assess the information management is opportunistically 
disclosing and its influence on litigation risk.  Thus, PKM suggests management‟s 
opportunistic presentation would amplify the effect of investors‟ motivated reasoning 
goals on their litigation risk assessments.   
The extent to which investors‟ directional interpretations of management‟s 
opportunism further decreases long investors‟ and increases short investors‟ litigation risk 
judgments depends on how close they already are to the bounds of reasonableness 
constraints when management presents the additional low probability lawsuits in a more 
objective manner.  If investors are already close to their reasonableness constraints in the 
objective amendment condition, when management presents the lawsuits 
opportunistically, there may be little room for long investors‟ judgments to decrease and 
short investors‟ judgments to increase and still be within their reasonableness constraints.  
However, if investors are not already at the limits of their reasonableness constraints in 
the objective amendment condition, there would be room for their judgments to move in 
the directions consistent with their respective motivated reasoning goals.  This would 
lead to greater differences between investors‟ judgments when disclosures are presented 
in a more opportunistic manner than when they are presented in a more objective manner.  
The following hypothesis will be tested: 
H3a:  The differences across long, prospective, and short investors‟ litigation risk 
judgments when litigation disclosures are presented opportunistically under the 
lower threshold will be greater than or equal to the differences when litigation 
disclosures are presented more objectively under the lower threshold. 
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3.2.6.2     Emphasis Framing Theory 
In contrast to PKM, emphasis framing theory predicts that management‟s 
opportunistic presentation will work as intended, despite investors‟ motivated reasoning 
goals.  According to this theory, communicators can influence others‟ opinions by 
emphasizing particular considerations over other relevant considerations when giving 
their interpretation of an issue (Nelson et al. 1997; Nelson and Oxley 1999; Druckman 
2001; McCaffery and Baron 2004; Maule and Villejoubert 2007; Slothuus 2008).  For 
example, Shankar and Tan (2006) find audit preparers use emphasis framing to persuade 
reviewers by using language that emphasizes evidence that supports their preferred 
conclusion and downplays evidence that contradicts their conclusion.  In addition, prior 
research demonstrates that strategic persuasion attempts can be successful (Ricchuite 
1999; Tan and Yip-Ow 2001; Kadous et al. 2005).  This suggests that, by strategically 
framing litigation disclosures, management may successfully persuade investors to 
perceive the litigation in a light most favorable to the firm. 
 Under the recently proposed lower probability threshold, managers would now 
have a mechanism to persuade investors to see the litigation in a more favorable light.  A 
lower threshold would allow managers to point out that the accounting standard requires 
disclosure of lawsuits with very small probabilities of material loss and would provide 
investors with examples of such lawsuits.  These low probability examples may increase 
the credibility of management‟s opportunistic presentation and lead investors to interpret 
the disclosed litigation, on the whole, as fairly innocuous. 
Motivated reasoning theory would predict this type of opportunistic disclosure to 
influence different types of investors differently, depending on their motivated reasoning 
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goals. Even without the opportunistic presentation of the litigation, long investors are 
likely already assessing the likelihood of firm loss as low as they can within 
reasonableness constraints.  An opportunistic presentation would further decrease their 
judgments only if they are not already at the bounds of their reasonableness constraints 
when the same lawsuits are disclosed more objectively (and then only to the extent of 
their bounds).  In contrast, short investors are likely to interpret the more objective 
disclosure of the lawsuits as suggesting the highest litigation risk that they can reasonably 
justify. If these investors are persuaded by management‟s opportunism as suggested by 
emphasis framing theory, their perceptions of litigation risk have much more room to 
decrease than long investors‟ judgments. These investors still have motivations to 
interpret the disclosure as unfavorably for the firm as they can reasonably justify. 
However, if management‟s opportunistic presentation is successful, they may find it more 
difficult to rationalize a negative interpretation of the disclosure and, in turn, assess the 
likelihood of firm losses lower (their directional goals notwithstanding).  Thus, 
persuasive opportunistic disclosures can shift the reasonableness constraint on short 
investors‟ natural goals to assess the likelihood of loss as high as possible. Factors that 
shift reasonableness constraints against individuals‟ preferences tend to counteract the 
effects of directional goals to reach a preferred conclusion (e.g., Peecher et al. 2010, Ng 
and Shankar 2010). The extent to which prospective investors‟ judgments can similarly 
decrease in response to management‟s opportunism depends upon how strongly the 
assimilation effect predicted in H1 already decreased their judgments (i.e., how close 
they already are to the lowest reasonable judgment in the objective amendment condition 
due to a heuristic incorporation of additional low probability lawsuits). 
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Thus, emphasis framing theory predicts that management‟s opportunistic 
presentation will tend to persuade all investors, leading them all to assess the firm‟s 
litigation risk to be relatively low, within reasonable limits.  As a result, the differences 
across long, prospective, and short investors‟ perceptions of the firm should be smaller 
when disclosures are presented in a more opportunistic manner than when the same 
lawsuits are presented in a more objective manner.  The following hypothesis will be 
tested: 
H3b:  The differences across long, prospective, and short investors‟ litigation risk 
judgments will be smaller when litigation disclosures are presented 
opportunistically under the lower threshold than when they are presented more 
objectively under the lower threshold. 
 
3.3 Method 
 
3.3.1 Participants 
 
Consistent with prior research, I use graduate business students as a source for 
nonprofessional investors (e.g., Maines and McDaniel 2000; Sedor 2002; Barton and 
Mercer 2005; Krishe 2005; Mercer 2005; Elliott et al. 2007; Hales 2007; Elliott et al. 
2010; Han and Tan 2010; Thayer 2011).  One hundred fifty individuals enrolled in MBA 
courses served as my participants (see Table 1 for number of participants by experimental 
condition).
3
  On average, participants had approximately seven years of professional 
business experience, and 95% had previously invested or planned to invest in the stock 
market (see Table 2 for sample demographic data). 
                                                          
3
 A substantial majority of the participants (117) were enrolled as MBA students, with another 32 enrolled 
in similar programs (e.g., Master of Management Practice).  Results are unchanged if only those identifying 
themselves as MBA students are included in the sample.  Nonprofessional investors are an important group 
to study in this setting, as they own one-third of all U.S. stocks (Bogle 2006).  As of 2005, 23.3 million 
people held shares of individual companies‟ stock outside of employer plans (Elliott et al. 2010).  Research 
in finance suggests that this class of investors influences security prices (DeLong et al. 1989, 1991).  
Furthermore, the FASB has expressed their concern for nonprofessional investors in the debate over the 
proposed changes to SFAS 5 (Herz 2008).   
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3.3.2 Experimental Task and Procedure 
 
Participants completed a web-based instrument which I developed using Qualtrics 
(see appendix for screen shots of the instrument).  The case asked participants to evaluate 
financial information relating to a hypothetical pharmaceutical firm.  Participants 
received the firm‟s income statements and balance sheets for each of the last three years, 
 
 
TABLE 1 
Participants by Experimental Condition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
along with financial statement disclosures regarding pending litigation.  After examining 
the firm‟s financial statements and legal disclosures, participants assessed the likelihood 
that the firm will incur a future material loss due to the disclosed litigation (i.e., litigation 
risk).  I asked participants for the likelihood of loss due to the disclosed litigation (rather 
than all litigation) to insure the internal validity of my tests of H1 and H2.
4
  Participants 
recorded their responses on an eleven-point scale, where 0 = “material loss not at all 
                                                          
4
 That is, if an individual presumes any undisclosed (below-the-disclosure-threshold) lawsuits exist, these 
suits should not factor into the individual‟s assessment of risk due to disclosed litigation.  Thus, any 
decrease in this assessment when low probability lawsuits are included in the disclosure is unambiguously 
non-normative. 
 
 
 
Investor 
Position 
 
 
 
 
SFAS 5 
 
Disclosure Type 
 
Objective 
Amendment 
 
 
 
Opportunistic 
Amendment 
 
Long 
 
n = 21 
 
n = 16 
 
n = 15 
 
Prospective 
 
n = 19 
 
n = 18 
 
n = 16 
 
Short 
 
n = 16 
 
n = 12 
 
n = 17 
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likely” and 10 = “material loss very likely.”  Participants then answered a series of case-
related and demographic questions, including manipulation checks. 
3.3.3 Independent Variables 
 
3.3.3.1     Investor Position 
 
Two independent variables (investor position and litigation disclosure type) were 
manipulated between participants resulting in a 3×3 analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
 
 
TABLE 2 
Sample Demographic Data 
 
 
Panel A: Proportion of participants who invested in the past or planned to do so in the 
future 
 
 
n percent 
Yes 142 94.7 
No 8 5.3 
 
 
Panel B: Gender 
 
 
n percent 
Male 96 64 
Female 54 36 
 
 
Panel C: Participants’ professional and academic experience 
 
Demographic Variable 
Sample 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Years of Professional Experience 6.98 6.20 
Number of Accounting Courses Taken 3.25 2.60 
Number of Finance Courses Taken 2.53 2.21 
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design.  I manipulated investor position at three levels: long, short, and prospective.  All 
participants read summary financial information relating to two pharmaceutical firms (see 
Figure 2).  Following Thayer (2011), I designed these firms to have similar investment 
potential, and pretested this summary information on 59 masters of accounting students 
to ensure that the two firms were equally attractive (p = 0.865) and chosen with equal 
frequency (p = 0.369) (pretest discussed in more detail in following subsection).  Long 
(short) investors then chose one of the two firms in which to invest (sell short), aware that 
they would receive $15 if their chosen firm outperformed (underperformed) the other 
firm, or $5 otherwise (adapted from Thayer 2011 and Han and Tan 2010).  Prospective 
investors were told that they would receive $10 for evaluating one of the two firms, 
selected at random by the computer (adapted from Han and Tan 2010).  All participants 
then evaluated the financial statements of the selected firm, which I held constant for 
both firms (as in Thayer 2011).
5
  Thus, long and short investors had directional 
preferences for their chosen investment, which could influence their beliefs about the 
financial statements they would evaluate, while prospective investors evaluated the same 
financial statements without directional preferences.   
Having participants choose an investment for which they will actually be paid 
based on their investment position is a fairly strong manipulation of directional 
preferences (Thayer 2011), especially compared to other accounting research that merely 
gives participants the directional preferences of fictional sources (e.g., audit supervisors, 
clients).  I feel that this is an appropriate design choice in my setting given that real-world 
investors face similar economic consequences when choosing among firms in which to 
                                                          
5
 As the summary information for both firms is based on the same underlying set of financial statements, 
the subsequent financial statements and disclosures participants received were identical regardless of which 
of the two firms was selected. 
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invest.  As a result, my experimental participants (like real-world investors) will be likely 
to have both relatively strong directional goals and relatively salient reasonableness 
constraints (as discussed in H2a and b). 
3.3.3.1.1     Pretests of Two Firms used in Experimental Materials 
  Prior to gathering data for my main experiment, I ran two pretests to ensure that 
the firms presented in Figure 2 were approximately equally attractive investments and 
 
FIGURE 2 
Excerpt from Background Experimental Materials 
 
 
 
Note: 
All participants were given this summary information prior to evaluating the selected firm.  Long 
and short investors were asked to pick one of these two firms in which to take their assigned 
investment position.  Prospective investors were also given this information, but were not asked to 
pick a firm.  Instead, prospective investors were told they would be asked to objectively evaluate 
one of these two firms (subsequently chosen at random by the computer). 
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would be chosen by participants with approximately equal frequencies, following Thayer 
(2011).  For both pretests, I presented participants with four different pairs of firms (see 
Figure 2), including the two that were ultimately used in the main experiment.  
The four pairs of firms were developed by me.  I included three financial 
statement ratios and four qualitative statements for each firm in each pair.  This was done 
to create different firms with similar investment potential within each pair.  The financial 
statement ratios were developed from the same underlying financial statements within 
each pair, but the actual ratios shown for each firm were different (e.g., Return on Assets 
is presented for one firm versus Return on Equity for the other).  I created some of the 
qualitative statements and adapted others from Thayer (2011).  My goal was to create 
pairs of firms that had similar investment potential, but that appeared to have unique 
characteristics so that participants felt there was a choice between the firms.  That is, 
while I did not want one firm to clearly outperform the other, I wanted them to be 
different on some (non-financial) dimensions so that participants might genuinely have a 
preference for one over the other (in an effort to increase the likelihood the feel 
“invested” in their company). 
In the first pretest, 31 masters of accounting students were presented with these 
four different pairs of firms.
6
  For each pair, I asked participants to make a choice to 
invest in one of the two firms.  The results of the pretest (displayed in Table 3) showed 
that 18 participants chose Karlow and 13 chose Bower (the two firms used in the 
experimental materials), indicating that each firm was chosen with similar frequency (χ2 
= 0.806, p = 0.369).   
                                                          
6
 To control for any possible order effects, I presented the four pairs of firms in reverse order to half of the 
participants in both pretests.  No significant differences were found between participants that received the 
four pairs in the original order or in the reverse order.  
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In a second pretest, 28 masters of accounting students were asked to rate the 
investment attractiveness of each firm from each of the four pairs on scales of 0 (not 
attractive) to 10 (very attractive).  Pretest participants rated Karlow (mean = 7.39) and 
Bower (mean = 7.32) as approximately equally attractive investments (t = 0.171, p = 
0.865).  Ultimately, I chose the Karlow and Bower pair for the main experiment because 
they were both chosen with similar frequency and their attractiveness ratings were the 
most similar among all the pairs. 
 
 
TABLE 3 
Pretests of Firm Pairings 
 
Pair 
Firm 
Names 
Frequency 
Chosen 
a
 
Mean 
Attractiveness 
b
 
Attractiveness 
Differences 
within each 
Pair 
c
 
1 Samper 13 6.64 
0.50 
1 Groft 18 7.14 
2 Troper 14 6.93 
0.46 
2 Rone 17 7.39 
3 Karlow 18 7.39 
0.07 
3 Bower 13 7.32 
4 Varic 18 7.86 
1.00 
4 Milex 12 6.86 
 
Notes:  
a
 Thirty-one pretest participants were asked to chose to invest in one of the two firms within each 
of the four pairs.  One participant failed to make a choice for the fourth pair. 
b
 Twenty-eight pretest participants rated the attractiveness of each paired firm as a potential 
investment opportunity.  Participants recorded their responses on an eleven-point scale, where 0 = 
“not attractive” and 10 = “very attractive”.   
c
 The absolute value of the difference between pretest participants‟ mean attractiveness ratings 
within each pair. 
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3.3.3.2     Disclosure Type 
 
The second independent variable, disclosure type, was manipulated at three levels 
and refers to whether the legal disclosures were in compliance with: (1) current SFAS 5 
(SFAS 5 condition); (2) the FASB‟s proposed amendment presented more objectively 
(objective amendment condition); or (3) the FASB‟s proposed amendment presented  
more opportunistically (opportunistic amendment condition).  The disclosure in the SFAS 
5 condition contained one reasonably possible lawsuit.  Management introduced the 
litigation by stating that the existing accounting standard (i.e., SFAS 5) requires 
disclosure of lawsuits that management believes have at least a reasonably possible 
likelihood of resulting in a material liability.  The two proposed amendment conditions 
each contained the same reasonably possible lawsuit as the SFAS 5 condition, as well as 
three additional lawsuits that are less than reasonably possible but more than remote.  In 
all three disclosure type conditions, each lawsuit was individually identified as having 
either a “reasonably possible” or a “slightly more than remote” likelihood of leading to a 
material loss. Thus, in both the objective and opportunistic amendment conditions, the 
financial statements provided the same set of lawsuits and disclosed the same likelihoods 
of loss for each. 
In the objective amendment condition, management relayed the facts of the 
pending litigation in a fairly straightforward and direct manner, with little “spin”.  
Management introduced the litigation by stating that the accounting standard requires 
disclosure of lawsuits that management believes have more than a remote likelihood of 
resulting in a material liability.  The reasonably possible lawsuit was the first disclosed, 
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followed by the three lower probability lawsuits.  All lawsuits were labeled to clearly 
distinguish one lawsuit from the next.     
To create disclosures in compliance with the lower probability threshold that were 
more opportunistically presented, I referred to actual financial statement disclosures, 
emphasis framing theory, and the prior accounting literature.  Based on this examination, 
I identified persuasion tactics that are available to management in a litigation disclosure 
setting: the placement, labeling, and framing of lawsuits within the disclosure (Bouwman 
1982; Hunton and McEwen 1997; Nelson et al. 1997; Nelson and Oxley 1999; Maines 
and McDaniel 2000; Druckman 2001; Lipe and Salterio 2002; McCaffery and Baron 
2004; Maule and Villejoubert 2007; Slothuus 2008; Bonner 2008).  Following prior 
persuasion research in accounting, the presentation of the disclosures under the proposed 
amendment in this study made use of all three persuasion tactics that would be available, 
practicable, and likely to be used simultaneously by managers to craft disclosures which 
are more opportunistic versus more objective (Rich et al. 1997; Tan and Yip-Ow 2001).  I 
did this to more fully distinguish the opportunistic condition from the more objective 
condition (Kerlinger and Lee 2000).  Specifically, in the opportunistic amendment 
condition, management introduced the litigation by discussing the litigious nature of the 
industry and by strategically emphasizing that the accounting standard requires disclosure 
at a very low probability threshold.  Within the disclosure, management did not 
individually label each lawsuit and presented the reasonably possible lawsuit in the 
middle of the disclosure.  
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3.3.3.2.1     Opportunistic Disclosure Pretest 
 I used a pretest prior to gathering data in the main experiment to ensure that 
participants would perceive the disclosures in the opportunistic amendment condition to 
be more strategic and less objective than the disclosures in the objective amendment 
condition.  A pretest with 29 senior accounting undergraduates suggests that the 
disclosures in the objective amendment condition were less strategic than the disclosures 
in the opportunistic amendment condition (means = 4.48 versus 8.17, t = -7.97, on a scale 
where 0 = “not at all strategic” and 10 = “very strategic”; p < 0.001).  In addition, the 
disclosures in the objective amendment condition were viewed as more objective than the 
disclosures in the opportunistic amendment condition (means = 8.04 versus 3.82, t = 
9.03, where 0 = “not at all objective” and 10 = “very objective”; p < 0.001).  Further, all 
pretest participants also selected the objective amendment condition disclosure as the 
presentation that was the more objective and less opportunistic of the two. 
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CHAPTER 4 
DATA ANALYSIS 
4.1 Introduction 
 In this chapter, I provide the results of the manipulation checks, hypothesis tests 
and post-experimental questions.  To test my hypotheses, I analyze participants‟ 
responses using a 3×3 analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) with investor position and 
disclosure type as the independent variables and participants‟ perceptions of industry 
litigiousness as a covariate.  First, I test how prospective investors assimilate additional 
low probability lawsuits into their litigation risk assessments (H1).  Next, I test how long 
and short investors assimilate additional low probability lawsuits into their litigation risk 
assessments (H2a and H2b).  Finally, I test how an opportunistic disclosure strategy 
allowed by a lower accounting threshold influences investors‟ judgments (H3a and H3b). 
4.2 Manipulation Checks 
4.2.1 Investor Position 
I randomly assigned participants to one of three investor position conditions: (1) 
long (2) short and (3) prospective.  After reading the investment position manipulation in 
the case materials, I asked participants the following: 
“To ensure that you understand the manner in which you will be paid for your 
investment position, which of the following statements is true?” (I will be paid $15 if the 
company I selected is the better performer or $5 if it is the worse performer. / I will be 
paid $15 if the company I selected is the worse performer or $5 if it is the better 
performer. / I will be paid a flat $10 for providing my judgments.).  Participants 
successfully identified their respective compensation scheme based on their investment 
position 99% of the time, similar to Hales (2007) and Thayer (2011).  This suggests that 
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my manipulation of investor position was successful.  Results of my hypothesis testing 
are unchanged if the two participants who failed to correctly recall their investment 
position compensation scheme are removed from the analyses.  
4.2.2 Disclosure Type 
I randomly assigned participants to one of three disclosure type conditions: (1) 
current SFAS 5 (SFAS 5 condition); (2) the FASB‟s proposed amendment presented more 
objectively (objective amendment condition); or (3) the FASB‟s proposed amendment 
presented more opportunistically (opportunistic amendment condition).  In the post-
experimental questionnaire, I asked participants, “Approximately how many lawsuits 
were disclosed in the footnotes to Karlow‟s [Bower‟s] 2009 financial statements?” (one / 
four).  Participants correctly recalled the number of lawsuits disclosed 89% of the time.    
Next, participants responded to the following prompt: “According to the disclosures in 
Karlow‟s [Bower‟s] financial statements, the prevailing accounting standard requires 
Karlow [Bower] to disclose pending lawsuits when the likelihood they would lead to a 
material loss is:” (at least reasonably possible / more than remote).  Participants also 
correctly recalled the probability threshold 89% of the time.  Together, the results of 
these two questions suggest that my manipulation of disclosure type was successful.  
Results of my hypothesis testing are unchanged if those participants who failed to 
correctly recall the number of lawsuits disclosed and/or the probability threshold are 
removed from the analyses.  
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4.3 Tests of Hypotheses 
4.3.1 Introduction 
In this section, I present my hypotheses tests.  My hypotheses predict 
relationships between the two independent variables (investor position and disclosure 
type) and the dependent variable (investors‟ litigation risk assessments). I test my 
hypotheses using a 3×3 ANCOVA model and contrast tests where applicable.  Tests are 
one-tailed when I have directional expectations and are two-tailed otherwise. 
ANCOVA is appropriate when there is ancillary information related to the 
dependent variable available for each participant (Keppel and Wickens 2004).  Consistent 
with this, I measure participants‟ prior beliefs about the litigiousness of the 
pharmaceutical industry and find that these beliefs are correlated with their loss 
likelihood judgments (r = 0.253, p = 0.002), and that individuals who believe the industry 
to be more litigious tend to assess litigation risk higher across experimental conditions (F 
= 10.22, p = 0.002).  As such, I include this variable as a covariate when testing my 
hypotheses.  Results are similar if the covariate is removed from the model. 
Table 4 shows an ANCOVA of participants‟ litigation risk assessments, while 
Figure 3 shows their mean assessments from this model by experimental condition.  The 
ANCOVA includes participants‟ prior beliefs about industry litigiousness as a covariate.  
The investor position × disclosure type interaction (F = 2.37, p = 0.055, two-tailed) is 
displayed graphically in Figure 3.   
Figure 3 also shows that the ordering of long, prospective, and short investors‟ 
litigation risk assessments under the current, higher SFAS 5 probability threshold is 
consistent with their motivated reasoning goals.  Long investors judge litigation risk 
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lowest (4.92), followed by prospective investors (6.73), with short investors judging 
litigation risk highest (7.18).  A Jonckheere-Terpstra test confirms that this ordering of 
investors‟ judgments under the SFAS 5 threshold is statistically significant (z = -2.92, p = 
0.002, one-tailed).   
 
 
TABLE 4 
Analysis of Covariance 
 
 
Source 
Sum of 
Squares 
 
df 
Mean  
Square 
 
F 
 
p-value 
Industry Litigiousness (covariate) 42.36 1 42.36 10.22 0.002 
Investor Position 59.32 2 29.66 7.16 0.001 
Disclosure Type 59.55 2 29.78 7.18 0.001 
Investor Position × Disclosure Type 39.37 4 9.84 2.37 0.055 
Error 580.34 140 4.15   
 
 
Notes:  
Dependent variable: Litigation Risk Assessments. Participants assessed the likelihood that the firm 
will incur a future material loss due to the disclosed litigation.  Participants recorded their 
responses on an eleven-point scale, where 0 = “material loss not at all likely” and 10 = “material 
loss very likely”.   
 
Independent variables: Investor Position is manipulated as participants‟ position in the firm (long, 
short, or prospective investor).  Disclosure Type manipulated whether participants received 
pending litigation disclosures in compliance with SFAS 5 (i.e., “at least reasonably possible” 
threshold), the FASB‟s proposed amendment (i.e., “more than remote” threshold) presented more 
objectively, or the FASB‟s proposed amendment presented more opportunistically. Analysis 
includes a covariate, participants‟ perceptions of Industry Litigiousness, which is participants‟ 
responses to a post-experimental question about the litigiousness of the pharmaceutical industry 
(eleven-point scale where 0 = “not at all litigious” and 10 = “very litigious”). 
 
 
 
4.3.2 Test of H1 
 H1 predicts that prospective investors‟ assessments of the risk from disclosed 
litigation will decrease under the proposed standard even though more lawsuits are 
disclosed.  H1 is formally stated as follows: 
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FIGURE 3 
Litigation Risk Assessments 
 
 
 
 
Notes:  
 
Dependent variable (vertical axis): Litigation Risk Assessments. Participants assessed the 
likelihood that the firm will incur a future material loss due to the disclosed litigation.  Participants 
recorded their responses on an eleven-point scale, where 0 = “material loss not at all likely” and 
10 = “material loss very likely”.  Means reported above are derived from the ANCOVA presented 
in Table 4. 
 
Independent variables: Investor Position is manipulated as participants‟ position in the firm (long, 
short, or prospective investor).  Disclosure Type manipulated whether participants received 
pending litigation disclosures in compliance with SFAS 5 (i.e., “at least reasonably possible” 
threshold), the FASB‟s proposed amendment (i.e., “more than remote” threshold) presented more 
objectively, or the FASB‟s proposed amendment presented more opportunistically.   
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H1:  Prospective investors will judge the risk from disclosed litigation lower 
under the lower “more than remote” threshold than under the higher “at least 
reasonably possible” threshold, even though additional lawsuits are disclosed. 
 
 As Figure 3 shows, prospective investors‟ litigation risk assessments decreased 
from 6.73 in the current SFAS 5 condition to 5.54 in the objective amendment condition 
(t= 1.77, p = 0.040, one-tailed).  This result supports H1.  It appears that the influence of 
the reasonably possible lawsuit on prospective investors‟ litigation risk assessments is 
diluted by the low probability lawsuits under the lower threshold.  Thus, prospective 
investors assess litigation risk lower under a lower threshold, even though more lawsuits 
are disclosed.   
4.3.3 Tests of H2a and H2b 
Hypothesis 2a predicts that long investors‟ litigation risk judgments in the 
objective amendment condition will be less than or equal to those in the current SFAS 5 
condition.  Hypothesis 2b similarly predicts that short investors‟ judgments in the 
objective amendment condition will be greater than or equal to those in the current SFAS 
5 condition.  H2a and H2b are formally stated as follows: 
H2a:  Long investors‟ judgments of litigation risk under the lower “more than 
remote” threshold will be less than or equal to their judgments under the higher 
“at least reasonably possible” threshold. 
 
H2b:  Short investors‟ judgments of litigation risk under the lower “more than 
remote” threshold will be greater than or equal to their judgments under the 
higher “at least reasonably possible” threshold. 
 
As Figure 3 shows, long and short investors‟ judgments did not change 
significantly between the current SFAS 5 condition and the objective amendment 
condition (4.92 vs. 4.95, t = 0.03, p = 0.485 and 7.18 vs. 7.43, t = 0.32, p = 0.374, 
respectively, both one-tailed).  These results are consistent with H2a and H2b, and 
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suggest that long and short investors‟ judgments were at or close to the bounds of their 
reasonableness constraints in both the current SFAS 5 and objective amendment 
conditions.  This is also consistent with my relatively strong manipulation of directional 
goals, as noted in Chapter 3. 
4.3.4 Tests of H3a and H3b 
Following the PKM, H3a predicts that the differences across long, prospective, 
and short investors‟ loss likelihood judgments will be larger in the opportunistic 
amendment than in the objective amendment condition.  In contrast, and consistent with 
emphasis framing theory, H3b makes the competing prediction that those differences will 
be smaller in the opportunistic amendment condition.  H3a and H3b are formally stated 
as follows: 
H3a:  The differences across long, prospective, and short investors‟ litigation risk 
judgments when litigation disclosures are presented opportunistically under the 
lower threshold will be greater than or equal to the differences when litigation 
disclosures are presented more objectively under the lower threshold. 
 
H3b:  The differences across long, prospective, and short investors‟ litigation risk 
judgments will be smaller when litigation disclosures are presented 
opportunistically under the lower threshold than when they are presented more 
objectively under the lower threshold. 
 
As Figure 3 shows, short and prospective investors‟ judgments appear to converge 
toward long investors‟ judgments in the opportunistic amendment condition, consistent 
with H3b and inconsistent with H3a.  First, to test whether the differences across long, 
prospective, and short investors change at all, I conducted a 3×2 ANCOVA across the 
three investment positions (long, prospective, and short) and the two relevant amendment 
conditions (objective and opportunistic), and find a statistically significant interaction (F 
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= 3.28, p = 0.042; non-tabulated).
7
  Next, a Jonckheere-Terpstra test shows that the 
ordering of long, prospective, and short investors‟ litigation risk judgments is significant 
within the objective amendment condition (i.e., across 4.95, 5.54, and 7.43, respectively; 
z = −3.40, p < 0.001, one-tailed), but insignificant within the opportunistic amendment 
condition (i.e., across 4.75, 4.93, and 4.76, respectively; z = 0.02, p = 0.984).  Similarly, 
the difference between long and short investors‟ judgments is significant within the 
objective amendment condition (4.95 vs. 7.43, t = 3.17, p = 0.001, one-tailed), but 
insignificant within the opportunistic amendment condition (4.75 vs. 4.76, t = 0.00, p = 
0.988).  That is, the difference between long and short investors‟ judgments is 
significantly smaller in the opportunistic amendment condition than in the objective 
amendment condition (t = 2.85, p = 0.003, one-tailed).  These results support H3b, but not 
H3a. 
            Additional analysis suggests that the disclosure in the opportunistic amendment 
condition led short investors to view pending litigation as favorably for the firm as even 
long investors, despite their directional preferences.  As Figure 3 shows, long investors‟ 
judgments remain flat across all three disclosure conditions (4.92, 4.95, and 4.75), 
suggesting that (as in my tests of H2a), long investors were evaluating the disclosed 
litigation at the boundaries of their reasonableness constraints.  Specifically, long 
investors‟ judgments do not change between the objective amendment and opportunistic 
amendment condition (t = 0.28, p = 0.779).  In contrast, short investors‟ loss likelihood 
judgments decrease significantly from the objective amendment condition to the 
opportunistic amendment condition (7.43 vs. 4.76, t = 3.47, p = 0.001).  Moreover, within 
                                                          
7
 Keppel and Wickens (2004) suggest using such analyses when comparing three or more groups within a 
larger experiment. 
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the opportunistic amendment condition, both short and prospective investors‟ judgments 
appear to be as favorable to the firm as long investors‟ judgments (4.76 vs. 4.75, t = 0.00, 
p = 0.988 and 4.93 vs. 4.75, t = 0.25, p = 0.802, respectively).  Thus, my findings 
demonstrate that firms can use the opportunistic disclosures allowed by a lower threshold 
to their advantage, potentially persuading prospective investors and even short investors 
to view the disclosure as favorably for the firm as do long investors. 
4.4 Post-Experimental and Demographic Questions 
 After making their litigation risk assessments, I asked participants to answer a 
number of post-experimental questions and demographic questions.  In one set of post-
experimental questions, I asked participants to provide their opinions about the firm‟s 
legal disclosures.  Participants responded to the following four items on 11-point likert 
scales: 
1. “How objective are Karlow‟s [Bower‟s] legal disclosures?” 
(Not At All Objective / Very Objective) 
2. “How credible are Karlow‟s [Bower‟s] legal disclosures?” 
(Not At All Credible / Very Credible) 
3. “How forthcoming are Karlow‟s [Bower‟s] legal disclosures?” 
(Not At All Forthcoming / Very Forthcoming) 
4. “How reliable are Karlow‟s [Bower‟s] legal disclosures?” 
(Not At All Reliable / Very Reliable) 
I included these variables as covariates in the analyses I used to test my 
hypotheses.  The results of my hypotheses tests are not significantly affected when I 
control for these variables.   
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In addition, I asked participants to provide their opinions about the litigiousness 
of the pharmaceutical industry, the outlook for the pharmaceutical industry, and the 
outlook for the stock market.  Participants responded to the following three items on 11-
point likert scales: 
1. “How litigious is the pharmaceutical industry, in your opinion?” 
(Not At All Litigious / Very Litigious) 
2. “What do you believe is the current outlook for the pharmaceutical industry?” 
(Very Negative Outlook / Very Positive Outlook) 
3. “What do you believe is the current outlook for the stock market in general?” 
(Very Negative Outlook / Very Positive Outlook) 
I included these variables as covariates in the analyses I used to test my 
hypotheses.  I found that individuals who believe the industry to be more litigious tend to 
assess litigation risk higher across experimental conditions (F = 10.22, p = 0.002).    
Conversely, I found that participants did not assess industry outlook (F = 1.54, p = 0.217) 
or stock market outlook (F = 0.51, p = 0. 477) differently across experimental conditions.  
Furthermore, participants‟ assessments of the litigiousness of the industry still remained 
significant after controlling for industry outlook and stock market outlook both separately 
and jointly.  As such, I included participants‟ perceptions of the litigiousness of the 
pharmaceutical industry as a covariate when testing my hypotheses, as noted earlier in 
this chapter. 
I also asked participants to provide some demographic information in the post-
experimental questionnaire.  For example, I asked participants to provide information 
about their educational background as follows: 
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1. “In which program are you enrolled?” 
o MBA 
o PMBA 
o MSA 
o MSF 
o Undergraduate Program 
o Other _______________ 
 
2. “Please indicate the name of the university where you are enrolled in the 
program above:” ____________________________________________ 
3. “How many accounting and finance courses have you taken, including the 
courses in which you are currently enrolled?”  
(sliding scale with endpoints 0, 20 courses) 
4. “Have you previously taken, or are you currently taking, a Financial 
Statement Analysis course?” 
(Yes / No) 
In general, I found that the results of my hypotheses tests are not significantly 
affected by including these demographic variables as covariates in my analyses.  
Participants‟ program type (F = 0.73, p = 0.393) and university (F = 0.16, p = 0.687) were 
not significant explanatory variables.  The number of accounting (F = 0.02, p = 0.889) 
and finance (F = 0.006, p = 0.940) courses participants had taken and whether they had 
completed a financial statement analysis course (F = 1.55, p = 0.215) also were not 
significant explanatory variables. 
Next, I asked participants to indicate whether they had work experience as a 
financial analyst and whether they ever invested in the stock market or planned to do so 
in the future.  I gathered this demographic information to support the notion that my 
participants were, generally, nonprofessionals with investing experience / interest (i.e., 
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appropriate participants for my investment task).  Results support this assertion.  I found 
that 95% had previously invested or planned to invest in the stock market. I also included 
these variables as covariates and found that previous investing experience (F = 0.006, p = 
0.939) and future investing plans (F = 0.21, p = 0.650) were not significant explanatory 
variables.  Further, excluding the 5% of participants who had neither previously invested 
nor planned to invest in the future did not affect the results of my hypotheses tests.  Only 
8% of participants had worked as a financial analyst, but this was not a significant 
explanatory variable (F = 0.22, p = 0.641).  Results remain similar when these 
participants are excluded from my hypotheses tests.   I also asked participants about their 
work history and advanced education as follows: 
1. Have you, or has anyone in your immediate family, ever worked in the 
pharmaceutical industry? 
(Self / Family Member / No) 
2. Have you, or has anyone in your immediate family, worked in the legal field 
(e.g., lawyer, paralegal, etc.)? 
(Self / Family Member / No) 
3. Do you hold any advanced degrees (e.g., M.D., D.O., J.D., Ph.D., etc.)? 
(Yes (if yes, please specify which degree) / No) 
The results of my hypotheses tests are not significantly affected by including 
these demographic variables as covariates in my analyses.  Having work experience in 
the pharmaceutical industry (F = 0.25, p = 0.618) or in the legal field (F = 0.619, p = 
0.433) were not significant explanatory variables.  Having an advanced degree was also 
not a significant covariate (F = 0.02, p = 0.899).   
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I also gathered demographic information about participants‟ years of business 
experience and gender.  I found that my results were not sensitive to years of professional 
business experience (F = 0.02, p = 0.896) or gender (F = 0.003, p = 0.957). 
4.5 Summary of Results 
 The results of this study suggest there may be unintended consequences of 
lowering a disclosure threshold, such as the one recently proposed by the FASB (2008).  
First, I find that adding low probability lawsuits to the disclosure of reasonably possible 
lawsuits lowers prospective investors‟ litigation risk assessments, even though more 
lawsuits are disclosed.  Second, lowering the threshold allows firms to portray the entire 
disclosure opportunistically, diverting attention from higher probability to lower 
probability lawsuits.  I find evidence that firms can use such an opportunistic presentation 
under a lower threshold to their advantage.  Specifically, prospective investors‟ and even 
short investors‟ litigation risk assessments were as favorable for the firm as long 
investors‟ when the disclosure threshold was lower and firms adopted an opportunistic 
disclosure strategy.  Thus, my findings suggest that the FASB‟s proposal to require 
disclosure of lower probability loss contingencies may have unintended consequences for 
investors‟ perceptions of firms‟ loss exposure. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSIONS 
5.1 Introduction 
 This study investigates two unintended consequences of lowering a disclosure 
threshold, motivated by recent FASB proposals.  In my experiment, nonprofessional 
investors were provided financial statements and legal disclosures for a hypothetical 
pharmaceutical company and were asked to assess the likelihood of material loss due to 
disclosed pending litigation.  Participants were randomly assigned to a long, prospective, 
or short investment position, and to one of three disclosure conditions.  Participants 
received disclosures: (1) with a probability threshold of “at least reasonably possible” 
(i.e., consistent with existing SFAS 5); (2) with a probability threshold of “more than 
remote” (i.e., consistent with the FASB‟s proposed amendment); or (3) with a probability 
threshold of “more than remote” (i.e., consistent with the FASB‟s proposed amendment) 
and an opportunistic reporting strategy allowed by the lower threshold.  The same 
reasonably possible lawsuit was presented in all three disclosure conditions, since both 
SFAS 5 and the proposed amendment would require disclosure of lawsuits at this 
probability threshold.  However, in the two lower probability threshold conditions, three 
additional lawsuits with a slightly more than remote likelihood of leading to a material 
loss were also disclosed in either a more objective manner or in a more opportunistic 
manner designed to persuade investors to perceive the litigation, as a whole, as less 
serious.  The sections that follow provide conclusions, implications, and directions for 
future research. 
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5.2 Discussion 
Recently, investors have criticized the quality of firms‟ loss contingency 
disclosures, by asserting that disclosures under SFAS 5 do not adequately allow them to 
predict and assess the likelihood, amount, and timing of future cash flows (FASB 2008).  
In response to investors‟ assertions, the FASB issued an Exposure Draft that, among 
other changes, proposes lowering the probability threshold for disclosure of loss 
contingencies from “at least reasonably possible” to “more than remote” (FASB 2008, 
paragraph 5).  According to the FASB (2008), this lower threshold would require many 
firms to disclose more pending lawsuits (FASB 2008).  My study reports the results of an 
experiment which investigates two unintended consequences of lowering the disclosure 
threshold. 
My results show that under the current SFAS 5 disclosure threshold, investors‟ 
judgments are consistent with their motivated reasoning goals.  That is, consistent with 
their preferences for higher profitability and share price, long investors assess the firm‟s 
likelihood of loss due to disclosed litigation lowest, while short investors (who require 
lower share prices in order to profit) assess the firm‟s likelihood of loss highest.  
Prospective investors, who have no position in the firm and therefore an incentive to 
objectively assess potential losses, fall in between short and long investors.  When the 
probability threshold is lowered to include low probability lawsuits, prospective investors 
decrease their loss likelihood judgments, even though more litigation is disclosed.  This 
finding suggests that the low probability lawsuits dilute the influence of the higher 
probability lawsuit on prospective investors‟ litigation risk assessments.  Conversely, 
long and short investors continue to be influenced by their directional preferences and 
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assimilate the additional low probability lawsuits in a manner that biases them toward 
their preferred conclusions.  My results also suggest that the form of management‟s 
presentation also influences investors‟ perceptions of litigation losses.  When managers 
use an opportunistic presentation under the lower probability threshold, they can 
successfully persuade all investors to perceive pending litigation more favorably for the 
firm, despite investors‟ directional preferences. 
5.3 Implications 
My findings have a number of important implications.  For example, my results 
should be of interest to the FASB as they continue to contemplate lowering disclosure 
thresholds in the ongoing SFAS 5 debate.  My findings suggest that the FASB should 
exercise caution if disclosure thresholds are lowered, as they may not result in better 
investor judgments.  The FASB‟s Exposure Draft as currently written leaves openings for 
managers to frame lawsuits in an opportunistic manner, and my results suggest that 
investors are persuaded by such a presentation.  My results suggest that policy makers 
should consider both whether and how disclosures are presented.   
While the SFAS 5 debate provides a timely backdrop for studying the 
consequences of expanding disclosure requirements, my findings may inform other 
settings in which similar disclosure expansions are being contemplated.  For example, in 
2010, the SEC implemented new requirements that publicly traded companies disclose 
any risks that climate change might pose to their future operations or profits (SEC 2010).  
Firms could choose to disclose all risks objectively (i.e., present both more and less 
remote risks in a transparent manner).  Alternatively, as this new mandate would require 
many firms to disclose more items, firms could use the new mandate to disclose 
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information opportunistically (e.g., strategically disclosing a number of very remote risks 
to draw attention away from potentially more serious ones).  Thus, similar unintended 
consequences could potentially occur in a variety of settings in which disclosure 
requirements are expanded.   
5.4 Directions for Future Research 
While my results may help inform standard setters and regulators about potential 
unintended consequences of an expansion of disclosure requirements, future research 
could explore factors that may moderate my findings.  For example, there may be factors 
that would cause a firm‟s opportunistic disclosure to have no effect on short sellers or 
even backfire (e.g., disclosures that go overboard, cf., Friestad and Wright 1994). Task-
relevant factors that amplify, impose boundary conditions, or even reverse the effects 
shown here are interesting possible directions for future research. 
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APPENDIX 
RESEARCH INSTRUMENT 
This instrument was administered on a computer.  The screens viewed by participants are 
provided on the following pages. 
 EXHIBIT 1. Instructions (Provided to Participants in All Conditions) 
 EXHIBIT 2a. Manipulation of Investment Position (Provided to Participants in 
the Long Investor Condition) 
 EXHIBIT 2b. Manipulation of Investment Position (Provided to Participants in 
the Prospective Investor Condition) 
 EXHIBIT 2c. Manipulation of Investment Position (Provided to Participants in 
the Short Investor Condition) 
 EXHIBIT 3a. Disclosure Threshold and Compensation Manipulation Check 
Screen (Provided to Participants in the Long Investor/SFAS 5 Condition) 
 EXHIBIT 3b. Disclosure Threshold and Compensation Manipulation Check 
Screen (Provided to Participants in the Long Investor/Objective Amendment 
Condition and the Long Investor/Opportunistic Amendment Condition) 
 EXHIBIT 3c. Disclosure Threshold and Compensation Manipulation Check 
Screen (Provided to Participants in the Prospective Investor/ SFAS 5 Condition) 
 EXHIBIT 3d. Disclosure Threshold and Compensation Manipulation Check 
Screen (Provided to Participants in the Prospective Investor/Objective 
Amendment Condition and the Prospective Investor/Opportunistic Amendment 
Condition) 
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 EXHIBIT 3e. Disclosure Threshold and Compensation Manipulation Check 
Screen (Provided to Participants in the Short Investor/SFAS 5 Condition) 
 EXHIBIT 3f. Disclosure Threshold and Compensation Manipulation Check 
Screen (Provided to Participants in the Short Investor/Objective Amendment 
Condition and the Short Investor/Opportunistic Amendment Condition) 
 EXHIBIT 4. Financial Statements Screen (Provided to Participants in All 
Conditions) 
 EXHIBIT 5a. Legal Proceedings and Contingencies and Dependent Variables 
Screen (Provided to Participants in the SFAS 5 Condition) 
 EXHIBIT 5b. Legal Proceedings and Contingencies and Dependent Variables 
Screen (Provided to Participants in the Objective Amendment Condition) 
 EXHIBIT 5c. Legal Proceedings and Contingencies and Dependent Variables 
Screen (Provided to Participants in the Opportunistic Amendment Condition) 
 EXHIBIT 6. Post-Experimental Questionnaire (Provided to Participants in All 
Conditions) 
 EXHIBIT 7a. Compensation Data Screen (Provided to Participants in the Long 
Investor Condition) 
 EXHIBIT 7b. Compensation Data Screen (Provided to Participants in the 
Prospective Investor Condition) 
 EXHIBIT 7c. Compensation Data Screen (Provided to Participants in the Short 
Investor Condition) 
 EXHIBIT 8. Demographic Questions (Provided to Participants in All Conditions) 
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EXHIBIT 1 
Instructions (Provided to Participants in All Conditions) 
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EXHIBIT 2a 
Manipulation of Investment Position (Provided to Participants in the Long Investor 
Condition) 
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EXHIBIT 2b 
Manipulation of Investment Position (Provided to Participants in the Prospective Investor 
Condition) 
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EXHIBIT 2c 
Manipulation of Investment Position (Provided to Participants in the Short Investor 
Condition) 
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EXHIBIT 3a 
Disclosure Threshold and Compensation Manipulation Check Screen (Provided to 
Participants in the Long Investor/SFAS 5 Condition) 
 
[Note:  If the participant chose to invest in Bower, all instances of “Karlow” would read 
“Bower”.] 
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EXHIBIT 3b 
Disclosure Threshold and Compensation Manipulation Check Screen (Provided to 
Participants in the Long Investor/Objective Amendment Condition and the Long 
Investor/Opportunistic Amendment Condition) 
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EXHIBIT 3c 
Disclosure Threshold and Compensation Manipulation Check Screen (Provided to 
Participants in the Prospective Investor/SFAS 5 Condition) 
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EXHIBIT 3d 
Disclosure Threshold and Compensation Manipulation Check Screen (Provided to 
Participants in the Prospective Investor/Objective Amendment Condition and the 
Prospective Investor/Opportunistic Amendment Condition) 
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EXHIBIT 3e 
 
Disclosure Threshold and Compensation Manipulation Check Screen  
(Provided to Participants in the Short Investor/SFAS 5 Condition) 
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EXHIBIT 3f  
 
Disclosure Threshold and Compensation Manipulation Check Screen 
(Provided to Participants in the Short Investor/Objective Amendment Condition and the 
Short Investor/Opportunistic Amendment Condition) 
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EXHIBIT 4  
Financial Statements Screen (Provided to Participants in All Conditions) 
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EXHIBIT 5a 
Legal Proceedings and Contingencies and Dependent Variables Screen (Provided to 
Participants in the SFAS 5 Condition) 
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EXHIBIT 5b 
Legal Proceedings and Contingencies and Dependent Variables Screen (Provided to 
Participants in the Objective Amendment Condition) 
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EXHIBIT 5c  
Legal Proceedings and Contingencies and Dependent Variables Screen (Provided to 
Participants in the Opportunistic Amendment Condition) 
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EXHIBIT 6 
Post-Experimental Questionnaire (Provided to Participants in All Conditions) 
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EXHIBIT 7a 
Compensation Data Screen (Provided to Participants in the Long Investor Condition) 
[Note:  Each participant receives one of the following screens depending on their firm 
choice and the resulting payout appropriate for that choice.] 
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EXHIBIT 7b 
Compensation Data Screen (Provided to Participants in the Prospective Investor 
Condition) 
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EXHIBIT 7c 
Compensation Data Screen (Provided to Participants in the Short Investor Condition) 
[Note:  Each participant receives one of the following screens depending on their firm 
choice and the resulting payout appropriate for that choice.] 
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EXHIBIT 8 
Demographic Questions (Provided to Participants in All Conditions) 
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